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THE STRUCTURAL CASE FOR
VERTICAL MAXIMALISM
Tara Leigh Grove†
Many prominent jurists and scholars, including those with outlooks as
diverse as Chief Justice John Roberts and Cass Sunstein, have recently advo-
cated a “minimalist” approach to opinion writing at the Supreme Court.
They assert that the Court should issue narrow, fact-bound decisions that do
not resolve much beyond the case before it.  I argue that minimalism, as
employed by the current Supreme Court, is in tension with the structure of the
Constitution.  Article III and the Supremacy Clause, along with historical
evidence from the Founding Era, suggest that the Constitution creates a hier-
archical judiciary and gives the Court a “supreme” role in defining the con-
tent of federal law.  But the Court today is limited in its capacity to perform
that function because it can review only a fraction of the lower federal and
state court cases involving federal law.  I argue that the Court should there-
fore make the most of the cases it does hear by issuing broad decisions that
govern a wide range of cases in the lower courts.  I call this approach “verti-
cal maximalism.”  (Notably, I use the term vertical maximalism to emphasize
that such broad decisions need not interfere with democratic processes, but
could direct all lower courts to defer to the political branches.)  Minimalism,
by contrast, undermines the Court’s capacity to perform its “supreme” role in
the judiciary.  When the Court issues a minimalist opinion, it leaves much to
be decided by the lower courts in future cases and thereby delegates its su-
preme law-declaration function to its judicial inferiors.  Such delegation un-
dermines the hierarchical judicial structure created by the Constitution.
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INTRODUCTION
At his confirmation hearing in September 2005, Chief Justice
John Roberts famously declared: “Judges are like umpires.  Umpires
don’t make the rules, they apply them.”1  He further stated that, as
Chief Justice, he would “remember that [his] job [is] to call balls and
strikes, and not to pitch or bat.”2
The Chief Justice’s image of judge-as-umpire has been widely crit-
icized as a questionable conception of the judicial function.  As vari-
ous commentators have observed, judges frequently make rules of law
in the course of adjudication.3  Indeed, it is not even clear that the
Chief Justice accurately described the role of an umpire.  An umpire
also makes rules in the course of a baseball game.  As one former ma-
jor league umpire explains, in order to call balls and strikes, an um-
1 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement
of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to Be Chief Justice of the United States) [hereinafter
Confirmation Hearing].
2 Id. at 56.
3 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Seeing the Emperor’s Clothes: Recognizing the Reality of Con-
stitutional Decision Making, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1069, 1069 (2006) (stating that “it is hard to
think of a less apt analogy”); James E. Ryan, Does It Take a Theory? Originalism, Active Liberty,
and Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1623, 1646 (2006) (reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE
LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADI-
CALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA (2005)) (ques-
tioning the comparison).
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pire must first establish a strike zone, which he is expected to apply
evenly to both teams throughout the course of a game.4
But the Chief Justice’s description of judge-as-umpire does accord
with his espoused judicial philosophy, one that seems to be winning
support among legal academics and judges: minimalism.5  Even if a
judge or a court must make a legal rule in the course of adjudication,
the court can limit the impact of its rule by adopting a minimalist
approach: defining the rule narrowly to encompass only the factual
circumstances before it.  Such a minimalist court does seem somewhat
analogous to a baseball umpire.  An umpire’s strike zone in one game
does not bind other umpires.  Likewise, when a minimalist court es-
tablishes a narrow legal rule to govern its own case, it leaves other
courts in other cases free to make their own rules of law.
I therefore am not sure that the Chief Justice’s analogy between
“judge” and “umpire” is inaccurate.  But I do believe that such a mini-
malist approach is wrong for the current Supreme Court.  The Court
does not serve as the umpire of particular disputes but instead over-
sees a vast network of lower federal and state courts adjudicating fed-
eral questions.  Drawing upon the structure of Article III and the
Supremacy Clause, I suggest that the Constitution creates a hierarchi-
cal judiciary and gives the Court a “supreme” role in defining the con-
tent of federal law for the judiciary.  I further argue that the current
Court cannot effectively perform that constitutional responsibility un-
less it issues broad decisions that govern a wide range of cases in the
lower courts.  I call this approach “vertical maximalism.”
I use the term vertical maximalism to emphasize that such broad
decisions need not interfere with democratic processes.  The Court
may, under the approach offered here, issue rulings that require all
lower courts to defer to the political branches (such as when it con-
cludes that economic regulations are subject to rational basis scrutiny6
or that courts must defer to an agency’s reasonable construction of an
ambiguous statute).7  Such broad rulings not only offer leeway to the
4 See KEN KAISER & DAVID FISHER, PLANET OF THE UMPS: A BASEBALL LIFE FROM BEHIND
THE PLATE 185–86 (2003) (stating that “[t]he strike zone as defined in the rule book . . . is
a myth” because “[n]o two umpires have the same strike zone[ ],” and further explaining
that “[t]he size of a man’s strike zone doesn’t really matter . . . what does matter is that it’s
exactly the same for both teams and that it’s consistent from the first pitch to the last out”).
5 See infra notes 14–26 and accompanying text.
6 See, e.g., Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331–32 (1981) (“Social and economic legis-
lation . . . that does not employ suspect classifications or impinge on fundamental rights
. . . carries with it a presumption of rationality that can only be overcome by a clear show-
ing of arbitrariness and irrationality. . . .  This is a heavy burden . . . .”).
7 See, e.g., Regions Hosp. v. Shalala, 522 U.S. 448, 457 (1998) (“If the agency’s read-
ing fills a gap or defines a term in a reasonable way in light of the Legislature’s design, we
give that reading controlling weight, even if it is not the answer ‘the court would have
reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.’” (quoting Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.11 (1984))).
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political branches but also provide considerable guidance to lower
courts.
Notably, I do not claim that vertical maximalism inevitably follows
from the hierarchical judicial structure.  Instead, I argue that this ap-
proach is the only effective way for the Court to preserve its “supreme”
role in our current judiciary.  At the Founding and for several decades
thereafter, the Court had no need to issue broad precedential deci-
sions; indeed, because Supreme Court opinions were not widely dis-
tributed until at least the 1830s, such an approach would have been a
rather ineffective means of supervising the lower courts.8  Moreover,
during that period, the Court had the capacity to hear every appeal
properly brought before it.  Thus, the early Court could effectively
communicate its views on federal law by, at least in part, issuing nar-
row decisions that corrected errors in specific lower court rulings.
By contrast, in our current judiciary, the Court can review only a
fraction of the lower federal and state court cases raising federal ques-
tions.  The Court must therefore make the most of the cases it does
hear by issuing broad (maximal) decisions that guide the lower courts
in the many cases that it lacks the capacity to review.  When the cur-
rent Court instead issues a narrow, fact-bound (minimalist) decision,
it leaves a great deal to be decided by the lower courts in future cases
and thereby delegates its supreme law-declaration function to its judi-
cial inferiors.  Such delegation undermines the hierarchical judicial
structure created by the Constitution.
This structural argument for vertical maximalism, of course, im-
plicates several recurring debates in structural constitutional law and
federal jurisdiction.  First, my contention that the Constitution creates
a hierarchical judiciary, rendering the Court “supreme” in defining
federal law, may have implications for the jurisdiction-stripping de-
bate.9  My argument may also raise questions about the consistency
between broad (maximal) Supreme Court decisions and Article III’s
case-or-controversy requirement,10 and may seem to blur the distinc-
tion between holding and dicta in Supreme Court rulings.11  Finally,
my argument may implicate horizontal stare decisis—that is, the ex-
tent to which the Supreme Court itself should be bound by these
8 See infra notes 234–47 and accompanying text.
9 Indeed, much of the recent literature on the structure of the judiciary has focused
on Congress’s authority to regulate Supreme Court jurisdiction. See infra note 217 and
accompanying text.
10 Cf. David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 190
(1988) (noting that Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was criticized as “illegitimate”
because it established a broad prophylactic rule, but urging that such broad decisions “are
not exceptional . . . but are a central and necessary feature of constitutional law”).
11 For a brief discussion of the relationship between vertical maximalism and dicta,
see infra note 138.
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broad decisions.  For now, I bracket these complex questions, leaving
them for future work.
I lay out the argument for vertical maximalism as follows.  In Part
I, I contrast minimalism and vertical maximalism, offering examples
from the case law to illuminate the distinction.  I also explain the dif-
ferences between this debate and the more familiar debate over rules
and standards.  In Part II, I discuss the hierarchical judicial structure.
Finally, in Part III, I offer a historical account of the Supreme Court’s
role in the judicial hierarchy.  I assert that, given its capacity con-
straints in our current judicial system, the Court cannot effectively
perform its supreme law–declaration function unless it employs verti-
cal maximalism.  Thus, the Court should aim to issue broad decisions
in every case to guide the lower federal and state courts on the mean-
ing and implementation of federal law.
I
CONTRASTING MINIMALISM AND VERTICAL MAXIMALISM
A. The Theory
In issuing any decision, a court must decide how narrowly or
broadly to write the opinion.  Naturally, that choice is a matter of de-
gree.  Any decision might conceivably be written more narrowly (cov-
ering only the specific litigants in the case) or broadly (deciding every
open statutory or constitutional question the court can envision).12
But most lawyers and academics can distinguish between relatively
narrow and broad opinions, and can identify a court’s attempt to limit
the reach—or to broaden the precedential scope—of its ruling.13
Recently, some scholars have urged the Supreme Court to follow
an approach known as “minimalism,” a term coined by Cass Sunstein
(minimalism’s most prominent advocate).14  Although “minimalism”
has been used to describe a variety of legal tasks (including statutory
and constitutional interpretation),15 I am most interested in the con-
12 See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1899, 1907 (2006)
(“[T]he difference between narrowness and width is one of degree rather than
kind . . . .”).
13 See infra Part I.B (discussing doctrines that have been criticized by jurists and schol-
ars as unduly narrow).
14 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT ix (1999).
15 Professor Sunstein suggested early on that “minimalism” offers an alternative to
what he describes as “maximalist” theories of statutory interpretation (textualism) and con-
stitutional interpretation (originalism). See id. at 210–11, 234–35.  More recently, he has
contrasted minimalism with three other theories of constitutional interpretation, which he
dubs perfectionism (an approach that offers broad protection of individual liberty), major-
itarianism (judicial restraint), and fundamentalism (originalism). See SUNSTEIN, supra note
3, at 25–51; id. at 27–30, 50 (explaining that, in constitutional interpretation, minimalists
not only favor narrow and undertheorized rulings but also respect precedent and generally
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\95-1\CRN104.txt unknown Seq: 6  3-NOV-09 10:57
6 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:1
cept as applied to opinion writing.  In this context, “minimalism” con-
stitutes “the phenomenon of saying no more than necessary to justify
an outcome, and leaving as much as possible undecided.”16  Minimal-
ist opinions are both “narrow,” in that they resolve only “the case at
hand,”17 and “shallow,” in that they decline to offer a broad theoreti-
cal justification for that holding.18  Thus, minimalist decisions are fact-
bound and undertheorized.  Notably, although Professor Sunstein
sometimes presents minimalism as a general theory of judicial deci-
sion making, he focuses primarily on the Supreme Court, and particu-
larly on its constitutional rulings.
Professor Sunstein has eloquently articulated the potential advan-
tages of minimalism.  The approach, for example, allows the Supreme
Court to reduce the costs of reaching a decision (“decision costs”)
because it need only decide a narrow issue presented by the particular
facts of the case before it.19  Minimalism can thus be quite beneficial
to this multimember court, whose personnel are likely to disagree on
many substantive issues but might be able to agree on the outcome of
a given case.20  Likewise, minimalism lowers the costs of an erroneous
decision (“error costs”) because a narrow decision will have little im-
pact on subsequent cases.21  Furthermore, minimalist decisions, at
least those that decline to decide constitutional issues, leave room for
democratic debate on those issues.22  Indeed, according to Professor
Sunstein, minimalist rulings may even serve as catalysts for delibera-
tive democracy by encouraging local, state, and national legislators to
address important legal questions.23  Professor Sunstein does not
“believe that judges should give the benefit of the doubt to the elected branches”).  As
discussed below, my theory of vertical maximalism is a theory of constitutional and statu-
tory implementation.  Accordingly, I do not advocate any particular form of interpretation.
See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
16 SUNSTEIN, supra note 14, at 3–4 (using this definition for “decisional minimalism”).
17 Id. at 10.
18 Id. at 13; see SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 27 (“As a matter of principle, minimalists . . .
favor shallow rulings over deep ones, in the sense that they seek to avoid taking stands on
the biggest and most contested questions of constitutional law.”).  For a brief discussion of
the need for some theoretical depth, see infra note 44 and accompanying text.
19 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 14, at 47; Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH.
L. REV. 353, 364 (2006) (“For any official, it can be extremely burdensome to generate a
broad rule in which it is possible to have much confidence.  Narrow decisions might there-
fore reduce the costs of decision . . . .”).
20 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 14, at 47.
21 See id. at 49 (“If it is wrong, a wide ruling may have especially high error costs,
because it will affect many subsequent cases.”).
22 See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 1915.
23 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 14, at 118 (claiming, with respect to affirmative action, that
the Court’s “complex, rule-free, highly particularistic opinions have had the salutary conse-
quence of helping to stimulate public processes and directing the citizenry toward more
open discussion of underlying questions of policy and principle”).
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claim that minimalism is appropriate in every case,24 but he urges that
it is the preferred course in many contexts.25
Several scholars and jurists, including Chief Justice Roberts and
Judge Richard Posner, have embraced minimalism.26  But others have
expressed concerns about the approach.  A number of scholars worry
that a general preference for minimalism could undermine the judici-
ary’s capacity to serve as the guardian of constitutional rights.27  These
scholars recognize that minimalism is not equivalent to judicial re-
straint; a minimalist decision may either uphold or invalidate govern-
ment action.28  But, these scholars argue, the courts (and particularly
the Supreme Court) must, in some cases, issue more “maximal” deci-
sions (such as Miranda v. Arizona29 or Reynolds v. Sims30) that broadly
define the scope of constitutional protections and thereby signifi-
cantly constrain government officials.31  Commentators have also
24 See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 1903, 1917 (opposing “any general preference for
narrow, case-by-case rulings” and instead advocating “a case-by-case inquiry into whether
case-by-case decisions are desirable”).
25 See Sunstein, supra note 19, at 362 (“[A]mong reasonable alternatives, minimalists
show a persistent preference for the narrower options, especially in cases at the frontiers of
constitutional law.”).
26 See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Separate But Equal?: The Supreme Court, the Lower Federal
Courts, and the Nature of the “Judicial Power”, 80 B.U. L. REV. 967, 1000 (2000) (urging the
Court to engage in “case-by-case formulation of narrow rules necessary to resolve particular
disputes”); Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
1454, 1458–59 (2000) (criticizing minimalism insofar as it counsels deference to the politi-
cal branches but expressly embracing the aspect of minimalism at issue here—“procedural
minimalism”—which “counsels . . . limiting the binding impact of [each] decision as
closely as possible to the particular facts of the case”); Richard A. Posner, Against Constitu-
tional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1998) (stating that he “like[s] Sunstein’s [minimalist]
approach”); Dru Stevenson, Judicial Incrementalism: A Reply to Professor Sunstein, 34 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 191, 192–93 (2008) (advocating “Sunstein’s gradualist approach” on eco-
nomic free-market grounds).  Although Chief Justice Roberts “resist[ed]” labeling himself
as a “minimalist” during his confirmation hearing, see Confirmation Hearing, supra note 1, at
158, his public statements make clear that he favors narrow decisions, see Chief Justice Says
His Goal Is More Consensus on Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2006, at A16 [hereinafter More
Consensus on Court] (reporting on Chief Justice Roberts’s address to Georgetown University
law graduates and quoting him as saying: “If it is not necessary to decide more to [dispose
of] a case, then in my view it is necessary not to decide more ”); infra note 315 and accom-
panying text.
27 See JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF AUTON-
OMY 163–67 (2006); Neal Devins & Alan Meese, Judicial Review and Nongeneralizable Cases, 32
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 323, 353 (2005); Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in Search of a Court, and Itself:
Judicial Minimalism at the Supreme Court Bar, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1951, 2015–17 (2005)
(“[M]inimalism . . . would eviscerate an essential part of the Supreme Court’s role.”).
28 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 44 (stating that minimalists “are not systematic believ-
ers in [judicial] restraint” but are “willing to be [judicial] activists too”).
29 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966) (requiring police to give specific warnings before in-
terrogating any suspect in custody).
30 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (establishing the one-person/one-vote rule for legislative
apportionment).
31 See FLEMING, supra note 27, at 163–67 (suggesting that “Sunstein’s argument for
judicial minimalism . . . amount[s] to a troubling withering away of the proper role . . . of
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doubted Professor Sunstein’s claim that minimalism can serve as a cat-
alyst for democratic deliberation, questioning whether Supreme
Court opinions can (or should) play this role.32
Finally, a few scholars have suggested that minimalism may be
inappropriate, as a policy matter, for the Supreme Court.  When the
Court issues a minimalist decision, it imposes costs on lower courts,
which must adjudicate subsequent cases with little guidance.33  Profes-
sor Sunstein does not deny this possibility.34  Indeed, in order for
minimalism to function as Professor Sunstein suggests, the Supreme
Court must leave issues open for future courts.35
In this Article, I articulate a related—but more fundamental—
concern.  I argue that minimalism, as employed by the current Su-
preme Court, is in tension with the structure of the Constitution.  The
Constitution (as discussed in Part II) establishes a hierarchical judicial
system and thereby suggests that the Court has a “supreme” role in
defining the content of federal law.  To fulfill that constitutional role,
courts as vindicators of constitutional rights”); Devins & Meese, supra note 27, at 353 (as-
serting that minimalism “unduly limits the Court’s power to shape constitutional values”);
Siegel, supra note 27, at 2015–16 (“[T]here are times when the Court should . . . insist that
the Constitution’s protections be vindicated robustly, not narrowly and shallowly.”).
32 See FLEMING, supra note 27, at 167–68 (doubting that “judicial minimalism will pro-
mote democratic deliberation . . . .  It may simply permit the political processes . . . to
trample on or neglect basic principles of liberty and equality”); Siegel, supra note 27, at
2010 (doubting that “minimalism significantly advances [Sunstein’s] deliberative demo-
cratic project” because it may “simply postpone . . . questions . . . for future litigation”);
Mark Tushnet, How to Deny a Constitutional Right: Reflections on the Assisted-Suicide Cases, 1
GREEN BAG 2D 55, 59–60 (1997) (criticizing minimalism to the extent that it “calls on
judges to make precisely those judgments that its premises [about judicial modesty and
institutional limitations] assert judges should not make”); Neal Devins, The Democracy-Forc-
ing Constitution, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1971, 1984–85 (1999) (reviewing SUNSTEIN, supra note
14) (noting that “[t]he Court’s power to alter the course of democratic deliberation is
premised on the belief that people pay attention to” the reasoning of Court decisions and
expressing doubt that the public or even legislators “pay much attention to court
decisionmaking”).
33 See Jeffrey Rosen, Foreword, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1330 (1999) (“When faced with a
narrow, shallow . . . decision . . . lower courts may literally be at a loss about what the
opinion means.”); Siegel, supra note 27, at 2006 (doubting that minimalism will reduce
“overall costs” because “[p]re-empirically, it appears . . . that whatever costs the Court saves
. . . by taking a minimalist path will be outweighed by the costs incurred by litigants, lower
courts, and political bodies”).
34 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 29 (noting that “narrow rulings can create big
problems for lower courts” but arguing that minimalism’s benefits often outweigh such
costs).
35 See Sheldon Gelman, The Hedgehog, the Fox, and the Minimalist, 89 GEO. L.J. 2297,
2305 (2001) (reviewing SUNSTEIN, supra note 14) (asserting that minimalist decisions can-
not simply be narrow but “must suggest—or at least . . . not contradict—the notion that
other applications of a right remain candidates for recognition in future cases”); see also
Jonathan T. Molot, Principled Minimalism: Restriking the Balance Between Judicial Minimalism
and Neutral Principles, 90 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1779 (2004) (observing that minimalism re-
quires shallowness because “[t]oo much principle would foreclose too many options” in
future cases).
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the Court must have some effective means of communicating its views
on federal law to the lower courts—at least within its sphere of appel-
late jurisdiction.  And (as discussed in Part III) the current Supreme
Court cannot effectively maintain such control over the development
of federal law unless it issues broad (maximal) decisions to guide the
inferior courts on federal questions.
I should, however, note some qualifications and clarifications
about this argument.  First, the notion of a superior role in defining
federal law is not the only plausible understanding of what it means to
be “supreme” in a judicial hierarchy.  A court might, for example, be
formally “supreme” if it had the power to reverse some number of
lower court judgments (whether or not it exercised that power).  Such
a concept of “supremacy” would not entail any duty to provide gui-
dance to inferior courts on the content of federal law.
But such an understanding would cast the Court’s “supreme” role
as a rather empty formality and finds little support in our traditions.
There is considerable evidence that we have long understood our Su-
preme Court to have a leading role in defining the content of federal
law for the judiciary.36  For example, the Court itself has declared that
it has a “responsibility to say what a [federal] statute means” and that
lower courts have a corresponding “duty . . . to respect [the Supreme
Court’s] understanding of the governing rule of law.”37  Although a
complete defense of this position is beyond the scope of this Article, I
assume (for purposes of this analysis) that this widely held view re-
flects the most plausible understanding of the Supreme Court’s role
atop the judicial hierarchy.  My goal here is to show how the Court
can most effectively perform that role.
Furthermore, I advocate vertical maximalism as a constitutionally
inspired (rather than a constitutionally required) norm.38  Accord-
36 See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 354 (2006) (stating that treaty
interpretation under federal law “‘is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department,’ headed by the ‘one supreme Court’ established by the Constitution” (emphasis
added) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803))); THE FEDERAL-
IST NO. 82, at 494 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (describing the
Court as “that tribunal which is destined to unite and assimilate the principles of national
justice and the rules of national decisions”); Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts
Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 873 (1994) (urging that the Court’s
“essential function” is to “provid[e] general leadership in defining federal law”); infra
notes 248–82 and accompanying text (discussing the Judiciary Acts of 1925 and 1988,
which gave the Court discretionary appellate review power, precisely so that it could better
perform its role of defining the content of federal law).
37 Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312 (1994) (emphasis added).
38 Cf. Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Com-
mon Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–4 (1975) (“[A] surprising amount of what passes as authori-
tative constitutional ‘interpretation’ is best understood as . . . a substructure of . . . rules
drawing their inspiration and authority from, but not required by, various constitutional
provisions . . . .”).
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ingly, I do not claim that a minimalist opinion “violates” the Constitu-
tion.  Instead, I urge that the structure of the Constitution counsels
against minimalism if the current Supreme Court is to fulfill its con-
templated role as the “interpretive leader”39 of the judiciary.  Whether
a maximal approach to opinion writing might be constitutionally obli-
gatory is a matter for another day.
I also want to underscore that the distinction between minimal-
ism and vertical maximalism is a matter of degree and not of kind.
Neither approach to opinion writing can easily be reduced to precise
definition.  Instead, both constitute general approaches to decision
making.  Thus, Chief Justice Roberts has urged his colleagues to de-
cide cases “as narrowly as possible,”40 thereby advocating a general
disposition for minimalism.  But the Chief Justice likely recognizes (as
Professor Sunstein has) that there is a point beyond which it would be
absurd to further narrow the precedential impact of an opinion—for
example, by limiting it to “people with the same names or initials as
. . . the litigants before the Court.”41  Conversely, I urge the Court to
adopt a general disposition for broad (maximal) opinions.  But I be-
lieve we can safely assume that no Court majority will go so far as to
write a treatise on a given area of law.
Indeed, the institutional realities of the Supreme Court tend to
press against vertical maximalism.  As Professor Sunstein observes, it is
easier for such a multimember body to agree on a narrow ground of
decision.  It will often be challenging to assemble even a five-member
majority for an expansive opinion (although the resistance might be
lower if the decision broadly defers to the political branches).  These
institutional constraints establish the (very real) practical boundaries
of maximalism.  Accordingly, my argument for vertical maximalism is
necessarily an aspirational concept.  I assert that, on the opinion-writ-
ing spectrum, the Court should favor the more maximal—while still
plausible—options.
Finally, I emphasize that vertical maximalism is not a theory of
constitutional or statutory interpretation.  It is a theory of constitu-
tional and statutory implementation (at least to the extent the con-
cepts are separable).42  Nor does this theory require the Court to issue
39 Caminker, supra note 36, at 866.
40 Jeffrey Rosen, John Roberts, Centrist? Partial Solution, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 11,
2006, at 8.
41 Sunstein, supra note 19, at 362.
42 One cannot, of course, entirely divorce the implementation of a legal principle
from its interpretation.  In some contexts, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the legal
principle may exclude certain “maximal” rulings. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 334–35 (1976) (concluding that due process requires courts to engage in a balancing
test to determine whether an individual is entitled to a hearing before the government
terminates benefits, rather than adopting a bright-line rule that would require such hear-
ings in all cases).  This is another reason why vertical maximalism is an aspirational con-
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specific rulings on the merits.  I advocate a method of opinion writing
for the Justices to use after they have decided to rule on the merits in a
particular way, using whatever theory of interpretation they favor.
This method of opinion writing is important, not because of what the
Supreme Court holds in a particular case, but because of how its opin-
ion distributes decision-making responsibility within the judiciary.
B. Applications
The Supreme Court has adopted a minimalist approach in a vari-
ety of contexts.  In this section, I offer examples from diverse areas of
the Court’s jurisprudence: federal question jurisdiction, lethal injec-
tion as a method of capital punishment, and the recognition of claims
based on customary international law under the Alien Tort Statute.  In
each area, I focus on what Kathleen Sullivan has described as the
Court’s “operative doctrines”—the “tests and levels of scrutiny that
will guide the lower courts . . . in future cases.”43  Many of the struc-
tural arguments that follow may, of course, also have implications for
the theoretical depth of an opinion.44  But, to simplify the comparison
between minimalism and vertical maximalism, I focus solely on the
breadth (or narrowness) of the Court’s operative doctrines.  As the
discussion below suggests, this aspect of Supreme Court opinion writ-
ing appears to have the most immediate impact on the lower federal
and state courts.
Notably, although much can be (and, indeed, has been) said
about the Court’s jurisprudence in these three areas, I am interested
only in the minimalism of the Court’s operative doctrine, not the mer-
its of its conclusion.  Accordingly, I offer vertically maximal alterna-
tives that would allow the Court to render assorted rulings on the
merits.  Furthermore, I do not mean to endorse any one of these max-
imal alternatives.  Instead, I offer them as a focal point for comparison
with the Court’s more minimalist approach.
cept.  The institutional constraints on the Court, as well as its views of the merits of the
underlying issue, may rule out some maximal options.  I nevertheless separate implementa-
tion from interpretation to underscore that my theory of vertical maximalism should be
compatible with a variety of interpretive approaches.
43 Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules
and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 69 (1992).
44 For example, the structural arguments below may suggest that the Court should
adopt what Heather Gerken has described as “intermediary theories” or “mediating princi-
ples,” which help courts “figur[e] out what [broad constitutional protections] mean[ ] in a
given context.”  Heather K. Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Minimalism in Voting Cases:
Baker v. Carr and Its Progeny, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1411, 1414 (2002).  The Court should perhaps
articulate such “mediating principles” whenever such principles are needed to clarify the
boundaries of the Court’s operative doctrine for lower federal and state courts.  For now,
however, I bracket this issue.
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A few final caveats: In offering these recent examples of minimal-
ism, I do not seek to show that the current Supreme Court is clearly
“minimalist” as a descriptive matter.  As Neil Siegel has observed, con-
cepts like minimalism and maximalism cannot easily be tested empiri-
cally.45  Nor do I contend that the Supreme Court has, in any of these
cases, taken the “most minimal” approach or that it necessarily should
have taken the “most maximal” approach (even if we could discern
with confidence what those approaches would look like).  But I think
we can nevertheless agree that these recent decisions fall on the mini-
malist end of the opinion-writing spectrum.  Indeed, in each context,
the Court’s operative doctrine has been criticized (by legal academics,
other Justices, or both) for offering insufficient guidance to lower
courts.
1. Federal Question Jurisdiction over State Law Claims
The Supreme Court has held that federal courts may have federal
question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over state law claims
when those claims raise federal issues.  A state claim may involve a
federal issue if, for example, a plaintiff brings a tort action, alleging
that the defendant committed negligence per se by violating a federal
regulation.46
To determine when federal courts have jurisdiction over such
claims, the Court has refrained “from stating a ‘single, precise, all-
embracing’ test.”47  Instead, as it recently reiterated in Grable & Sons
Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing, the Court has
instructed lower courts to examine, on a case-by-case basis, whether “a
state-law claim necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually dis-
puted and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without
disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state
judicial responsibilities.”48  Accordingly, the Court in Grable was care-
ful to confine its holding to the facts of the case, declaring that the
lower federal court in that case had jurisdiction “over Grable’s quiet
title action,” which rested on the construction of a federal tax
provision.49
45 See Siegel, supra note 27, at 1956.
46 See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 805–06 (1986) (alleg-
ing that the defendant was negligent under state law because it had violated federal food
and drug law); see also id. at 817 (finding no federal question jurisdiction over the claim).
47 Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005)
(quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 821 (1988) (Stevens,
J., concurring)).
48 Id.
49 Id. at 314–15, 320 (upholding federal question jurisdiction over the state law claim
because its validity depended on whether the Internal Revenue Service had provided the
plaintiff with adequate notice of his tax delinquency).
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A number of commentators have criticized the Court’s ad hoc
approach to federal jurisdiction.  And there are more maximal alter-
natives.  For example, some scholars have advocated a return to the
bright-line rule first suggested by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in
American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co.50  Under the Holmes
formula, federal question jurisdiction depends on the law that creates
the cause of action.51  Thus, courts always have federal question juris-
diction over federal claims but never over state claims (even those
with embedded federal issues).  Conversely, other commentators
(along with Justice William Brennan) have urged the Court to adopt
the opposite rule and find federal jurisdiction whenever a state claim
involves a nonfrivolous federal issue.52
Although these operative doctrines may not exhaust the range of
vertically maximal possibilities, either one would resolve far more
cases in the lower courts than the Court’s current approach.  Indeed,
the lower courts have struggled to apply the existing test for federal
question jurisdiction, with district courts and courts of appeals mark-
edly disagreeing over which state law claims belong in federal court.
One study reports that, while appellate courts reverse the bulk of dis-
trict court decisions approximately 12 percent of the time, they have
reversed district court rulings in this area at a far higher rate (65 per-
cent).53  These figures suggest that the Court’s minimalist approach to
50 241 U.S. 257 (1916); see Linda R. Hirshman, Whose Law Is It, Anyway? A Reconsidera-
tion of Federal Question Jurisdiction over Cases of Mixed State and Federal Law, 60 IND. L.J. 17, 72
(1984) (advocating a “return[ ] to the straightforward analysis set forth by Justice
Holmes”); Douglas D. McFarland, The True Compass: No Federal Question in a State Law Claim,
55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 58–59 (2006) (similarly advocating a “return to the powerful and
predictable rule of American Well Works”); see also Daniel J. Meltzer, Jurisdiction and Discre-
tion Revisited, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1891, 1913–15 (2004) (questioning whether lower
courts can apply the Court’s standard and suggesting a possible return to the “bright-line
rule . . . of Justice Holmes”).  Justice Clarence Thomas recently expressed support for this
approach. See Grable, 545 U.S. at 321 (Thomas, J., concurring).
51 See Am. Well Works Co., 241 U.S. at 260.
52 See Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 819–20 (1986) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (asserting that federal courts should have jurisdiction when the plaintiff’s
claim “depends upon the construction or application of the Constitution or laws of the
United States” as long as that federal issue “rests upon a reasonable foundation” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)); Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judi-
cial Business Between State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and “The Martian Chronicles”,
78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1794 (1992) (arguing that courts should have federal question juris-
diction when either “the cause of action is itself federally-created or the decision . . . may
turn on the interpretation or application of federal law” (footnote omitted)). But see David
L. Shapiro, Reflections on the Allocation of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts: A Re-
sponse to “Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Federal Courts”, 78 VA.
L. REV. 1839, 1841–42 (1992) (criticizing this rule and advocating a more standard-like
approach to federal question jurisdiction).
53 See Note, Mr. Smith Goes to Federal Court: Federal Question Jurisdiction over State Law
Claims Post-Merrell Dow, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2272, 2280 (2002).
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federal jurisdiction has imposed considerable costs on the inferior
federal courts.
2. Lethal Injection
In recent years, death row inmates across the country have chal-
lenged lethal injection as a method of execution, contending that (as
administered) it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in viola-
tion of the Eighth Amendment.54  The Supreme Court took up one
such challenge (involving Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol) in Baze
v. Rees.55
In Baze, the inmates objected to a three-drug protocol used by
Kentucky and virtually every state with a lethal injection procedure.56
The first drug (sodium thiopental) is a sedative, which is intended to
render the inmate unconscious and prevent him from feeling pain
during the administration of the other two drugs.57  The second drug
(pancuronium bromide) is a paralytic agent, which stops the inmate
from breathing and prevents sudden muscle movements that may dis-
turb spectators (like family members of the victim).58  The third drug
(potassium chloride) induces cardiac arrest.59  In the litigation lead-
ing up to Baze, the “most frequently cited complaint” was that the ini-
tial painkiller may not be administered properly (or at all), leading
the inmate to experience “excruciating pain” upon the injection of
the third drug, while the paralytic agent in the second drug would
prevent him from notifying prison officials of his plight.60  This was
also the core challenge in the case before the Court.61
Baze did not produce a majority opinion.  Chief Justice Roberts
announced the judgment of the Court and wrote for a three-Justice
plurality.  The plurality noted that “[t]hirty-six States that sanction
capital punishment have adopted lethal injection as the preferred
method of execution” and that thirty of those states, as well as the
54 See Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has Dismantled
the Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 107–16 & n.466 (2007) (describing challenges in
California, Missouri, North Carolina, Florida, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Maryland, and
noting that some state courts stayed executions).
55 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008).
56 See id. at 1525–27.
57 See Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death: The Troubling Paradox Behind
State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What It Says About Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63,
97–98 (2002).
58 See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1527, 1535; Denno, supra note 57, at 98.
59 See Denno, supra note 57, at 98.
60 Note, A New Test for Evaluating Eighth Amendment Challenges to Lethal Injections, 120
HARV. L. REV. 1301, 1302–03 (2007).
61 See Brief for Petitioners at 28, Baze, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (No. 07-5439).
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federal government, use the same basic three-drug combination as
Kentucky.62
Despite the prevalence of this method, the plurality limited both
its analysis and its holding to the case before it, declaring that Ken-
tucky’s protocol and procedures did not violate the Eighth Amend-
ment.63  The plurality thus did not foreclose future challenges to
lethal injection protocols, even in those states using the same three-
drug cocktail as Kentucky.  Other litigants, the plurality explained,
might be able to mount a successful challenge if they could identify an
available “alternative procedure” that was “feasible, readily imple-
mented, and in fact significantly reduce[d] a substantial risk of severe
pain.”64  But the plurality also expressed doubt that many future liti-
gants would be able to produce evidence of such an adequate alterna-
tive (even enough evidence to warrant a stay of execution).65  The
plurality opined that inmates would have particular difficulty bringing
challenges in states whose protocols and procedures were “substan-
tially similar” to those of Kentucky.66
Concurring separately, Justice John Paul Stevens criticized the
narrowness of the plurality decision.  He stated:
When we granted certiorari in this case, I assumed that our decision
would bring the debate about lethal injection . . . to a close.  It now
seems clear that it will not.  The question whether a similar three-
drug protocol may be used in other States remains open, and may
well be answered differently in a future case on the basis of a more
complete record.67
Justice Thomas, in a separate concurrence, likewise criticized the in-
determinacy of the plurality’s approach, stating that “today’s decision
is sure to engender more litigation” in the lower courts.68
The lower federal and state courts have already begun the diffi-
cult task of applying the plurality’s minimalist decision in Baze.  As
Dean Erwin Chemerinsky has noted, the plurality decision does not
provide “‘lower courts, legislators or lawyers [with] a clear sense of . . .
the rule of law to be followed and applied.’”69  Perhaps for that rea-
62 Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1532.
63 See id. at 1537–38.
64 Id. at 1532.
65 See id. at 1537 (stating that, to receive a stay of execution, an inmate must “estab-
lish[ ] that the State’s lethal injection protocol creates a demonstrated risk of severe pain”
and “that the risk is substantial when compared to the known and available alternatives”
and suggesting that “[a] State with a lethal injection protocol substantially similar to the
protocol we uphold today would not create a risk that meets this standard”).
66 Id.
67 Id. at 1542 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
68 Id. at 1562 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
69 Mark Sherman, Following Year of Division, Supreme Court Avoids 5–4 Splits, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, May 10, 2008, LexisNexis Academic (quoting Dean Chemerinsky).
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son, much of the litigation thus far has focused on the extent to which
another state’s lethal injection protocol and procedures mirror—or
differ from—those of Kentucky.70
There were vertically maximal alternatives that would likely have
resolved much of this lower court litigation.  For example, the Court
could have upheld the use of lethal injection as a method of execu-
tion (or at least have upheld the three-drug protocol used by Ken-
tucky, twenty-nine other states, and the federal government).  The
Court might have adopted an operative doctrine that places a heavy
burden on inmates who challenge execution methods by creating a
strong presumption—rebuttable only by overwhelming evidence to
the contrary—that state officials follow procedures designed to pro-
tect inmates from unreasonable pain.71
Alternatively, the Court could have invalidated the three-drug
protocol, perhaps relying on a rationale suggested by Justice Stevens’s
concurrence (which he ultimately did not adopt).72  Under that ap-
proach, a protocol that raises the possibility of any unnecessary pain
would be invalid.  Thus, the three-drug protocol would be unconstitu-
tional because it employs the second drug (the paralytic agent), which
prevents inmates from notifying officials that they are still conscious
and feeling considerable pain.73
70 For example, a Fourth Circuit panel issued a divided opinion applying Baze to Vir-
ginia’s lethal injection protocol. See Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2008).  The
majority concluded that “Virginia’s protocol for lethal injection is substantially similar to
that approved by the Supreme Court in Kentucky,” id. at 308, while the dissent found
significant factual distinctions, see id. at 309 (Gregory, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that,
while Kentucky uses three grams of the initial painkiller, Virginia uses only two grams).
Similar challenges have been raised in Delaware federal district court and Texas state
court. See Randall Chase, Attorneys Say Delaware Execution Went Bad, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June
23, 2008, LexisNexis Academic (noting a federal class action involving “whether Delaware’s
lethal injection protocol is significantly different from Kentucky’s”); Rosanna Ruiz, AG Says
Injection Question Settled; Supreme Court in April Upheld Execution Method Killer Is Contesting,
HOUSTON CHRON., June 7, 2008, LexisNexis Academic (observing that, in a case before the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, counsel for Texas claimed that the validity of its lethal
injection protocol was “fully disposed” of by Baze, while counsel for the inmate asserted
that “[i]t’s a misstatement that Kentucky’s protocol is exactly like Texas’ [protocol]”).
71 Justice Thomas suggested an even broader rule: any method of execution is consti-
tutional unless a state “deliberately designed [it] to inflict pain.” Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1556
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
72 See id. at 1543–44 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).  Justice Stevens stated
that, in an appropriate case, he would vote that capital punishment itself violates the
Eighth Amendment. See id. at 1551.  He nevertheless concurred in the judgment because
he believed that, under the Court’s precedents, “the evidence adduced by petitioners
fail[ed] to prove that Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol violates the Eighth Amend-
ment.” Id. at 1552.
73 In Justice Stevens’s view, the State had failed to provide a legitimate basis for using
the paralytic agent. See id. at 1544 (“Whatever minimal interest there may be in ensuring
that a condemned inmate dies a dignified death, and that witnesses to the execution are
not made uncomfortable . . . is vastly outweighed by the risk that the inmate is actually
experiencing excruciating pain that no one can detect.”).
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The Court also could have adopted the approach suggested by
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s dissent, which focused on the adminis-
tration of the three-drug protocol.  The Court could have required all
states to establish safeguards to ensure that an inmate was uncon-
scious before the paralytic agent was applied.  For example, as Justice
Ginsburg explained, in a few states, prison officials verify that the in-
mate is unconscious “by touching [his] eyelashes, calling his name,
and shaking him,” thereby “provid[ing] a degree of assurance . . . that
the [initial painkiller] has been properly administered.”74  In future
cases, lower courts could have required all states to demonstrate that
they had such procedures in place.
Any of these alternatives would have provided litigants and lower
courts with a “clear[er] sense of . . . the rule of law to be followed and
applied.”75  And there are undoubtedly other possible approaches
that would offer as much, if not more, guidance.  At a minimum, it
seems that the Court could have ruled on more than the execution
method of a single state.
3. Claims Based on International Norms
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) gives federal district courts jurisdic-
tion over “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”76  Al-
though the ATS (which was originally enacted as part of the Judiciary
Act of 1789) lay dormant for many years, the Second Circuit breathed
new life into it in 1980.77  In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,78 the court of ap-
peals held that an alien could bring an action under the ATS for cer-
tain violations of customary international law, such as torture.79
Following Filartiga, the lower federal courts struggled to deter-
mine what other human rights violations were actionable under the
ATS.  Indeed, as early as 1984, Judge Harry Edwards declared that,
given the “broad and novel questions about the definition and appli-
cation of the ‘law of nations,’” this “area of the law . . . cries out for
clarification by the Supreme Court.”80
Twenty years later, the Court took up a case involving the ATS.  In
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,81 the plaintiff, a Mexican physician, brought
74 Id. at 1570–71 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
75 Supra note 69 and accompanying text.
76 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
77 See Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga’s Firm Footing: International Human
Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 465–66 (1997).
78 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
79 See id. at 880, 887–88.
80 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J.,
concurring).
81 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
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suit against several Mexican civilians, alleging that they subjected him
to arbitrary detention in violation of international law.82  The plaintiff
claimed that the defendants, acting at the behest of the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), kidnapped him, held him over-
night at a motel in Mexico, and then transported him to the United
States to stand trial for his alleged involvement in the torture and
death of a DEA agent.83
The Sosa Court held that federal courts could recognize some
claims under the ATS for violations of customary international law.84
But it expressly declined to articulate the “ultimate criteria for ac-
cepting [such] a cause of action.”85  The majority declared that courts
“should not recognize private claims . . . for violations of any interna-
tional law norm with less definite content and acceptance among civi-
lized nations than the historical paradigms familiar when [the ATS]
was enacted” in 1789.86  But “[t]his requirement of clear definition
[was] not meant to be the only principle limiting [future ATS suits],
though it dispose[d]” of plaintiff Alvarez’s claim.87
The Court did not identify those other limiting principles, but it
did urge lower courts to exercise “great caution” and “restraint” in
recognizing new claims under the ATS.88  The majority counseled
lower courts to be “particularly wary of impinging on the discretion of
the Legislative and Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs.”89
It stated that one “possible limitation [on future claims] that we need
not apply here is a policy of case-specific deference to the political
branches.”90  The Court pointed to several pending class actions
against corporations that did business in South Africa during the
apartheid era.91  The governments of both South Africa and the
United States had urged dismissal of those suits, stating that they in-
terfered with the efforts of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation
Commission.  The Court suggested that “[i]n such cases, there is a
strong argument that federal courts should give serious weight to the
Executive Branch’s view of the case’s impact on foreign policy.”92
82 See id. at 698–99, 736.
83 See id. at 697–98.  The plaintiff was acquitted of the criminal charges before filing
suit. Id. at 698.
84 See id. at 729.
85 Id. at 732.
86 Id.  These historical paradigms were piracy, violations of safe conducts, and harms
to ambassadors. Id.
87 Id. at 733 n.21 (emphasis added).
88 See id. at 725, 727–28.
89 Id. at 727.
90 Id. at 733 n.21.
91 Id.  The suits allege that the corporations “participated in[ ] or abetted” the
apartheid regime. Id. For a discussion of the apartheid litigation, see infra notes 145–49
and accompanying text.
92 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21.
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The Sosa Court, however, was careful to confine its holding to the
specific facts before it.  And, to decide that case, it was “enough to
hold that a single illegal detention of less than a day, followed by the
transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt arraignment,
violates no norm of customary international law so well defined as to
support the creation of a federal remedy.”93
Concurring, Justice Antonin Scalia emphasized, among other
things, the impact that the Court’s decision would have on the lower
courts.  He predicted that, in identifying new causes of action under
the ATS, “the lower federal courts will be the principal actors; we re-
view but a tiny fraction of their decisions.”94  Thus, although the Sosa
decision, rejecting the plaintiff’s ATS claim, did “not itself precipitate
a direct confrontation” with the political branches, “it invite[d] pre-
cisely that action by the lower courts.”95
Sosa has generated a great deal of academic commentary.  And,
although scholars strongly dispute the degree to which the Court en-
dorsed the recognition of new claims under the ATS,96 they do appear
to agree on one thing: Sosa left a great deal undecided.97  Indeed, the
Court’s decision was openly minimalist, expressly declining to estab-
93 Id. at 738.
94 Id. at 750–51 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
95 Id. at 747; see id. at 748 (similarly predicting a “direct[ ] . . . confrontation with the
political branches”).
96 Compare Martin S. Flaherty, The Future and Past of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 67 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2004, at 169, 173 (urging that “[d]espite an excess of caution-
ary rhetoric,” the Court “guaranteed that the federal judiciary’s duty to engage with inter-
national legal standards in ATS suits would continue”), and Pamela J. Stephens, Spinning
Sosa: Federal Common Law, the Alien Tort Statute, and Judicial Restraint, 25 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 3
(2007) (“[W]hile the Court employs language of judicial restraint . . ., its actual holding
and the test it adopted foretell a less restrained use of customary international law . . . .”),
with Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary International
Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 891–92 (2007) (“[T]he
Court in Sosa strongly suggested that . . . courts should discern and apply [customary inter-
national law] more carefully and cautiously than many lower courts did prior to Sosa.”),
and Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy Reveals About
the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111, 115, 156–57 (2004) (asserting
that, given the Court’s demand for specificity in Sosa, human rights violations—including
war crimes, genocide, and torture—are not actionable under the ATS).
97 See Benjamin Berkowitz, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: United States Courts as Forums for
Human Rights Cases and the New Incorporation Debate, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 295
(2005) (noting “the Court’s failure to articulate clear standards to guide litigants and the
lower courts”); William A. Fletcher, International Human Rights in American Courts, 93 VA. L.
REV. 653, 672 (2007) (observing that Sosa “has left us with more questions than answers”);
Donald J. Kochan, Sovereignty and the American Courts at the Cocktail Party of International Law:
The Dangers of Domestic Judicial Invocations of Foreign and International Law, 29 FORDHAM INT’L
L.J. 507, 535 (2006) (asserting that Sosa did not provide “much guidance to lower courts”);
see also Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 96, at 898, 900–01 (noting the “lack of
clarity” in various parts of the Court’s decision).
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lish the “ultimate criteria” for a new claim under the ATS and empha-
sizing that its holding was limited to the facts of the case before it.98
There were, however, vertically maximal alternatives available to
the Court.  Justice Scalia suggested one possibility in his concurrence:
an operative doctrine providing that no new claims were actionable
under the ATS since it was only a grant of federal jurisdiction and did
not itself create any cause of action.99
Alternatively, the Court might have articulated a broad substan-
tive standard to guide future ATS litigation.  For example, the Court
might have said that a widely recognized violation of customary inter-
national law would be actionable,100 if the tortfeaser intentionally or
knowingly caused the victim extreme physical or mental pain and suf-
fering.  Such a standard would encompass many of the claims that
lower courts had found actionable, such as torture,101 genocide,102
sexual enslavement,103 and war crimes.104  But this standard would ex-
clude claims that courts had often (albeit not universally) rejected,
including financial misconduct,105 censorship,106 and negligence re-
sulting in personal injury or death.107
98 See text accompanying notes 85 and 93 supra.
99 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 743–44 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).  The majority agreed that the ATS was only a grant of jurisdiction and seemed
to agree that most jurisdictional statutes do not permit federal courts to create common
law causes of action. See id. at 713–14, 731 n.19 (majority opinion) (stating that its decision
did not “imply that every grant of [federal] jurisdiction . . . carries with it an opportunity to
develop common law”).  The majority nevertheless found that courts could do so under
the ATS. See id.
100 In using the phrase “widely recognized violation,” I mean to incorporate (as a
threshold requirement) the Court’s demand that the norm be “accepted” and “specific[ ].”
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
101 See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 845, 847–48 (11th Cir. 1996).  Courts
had also accepted claims of summary execution. See Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162,
184–85 (D. Mass. 1995).  Both claims are now expressly covered by the Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991, which allows citizens and aliens to bring suit. See Pub. L. No. 102-
256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)).
102 See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzˇic´, 70 F.3d 232, 241–42 (2d Cir. 1995).
103 See, e.g., Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F. Supp. 3, 5–6, 8 (D.D.C. 1998).
104 See, e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242–43; see also Goodman & Jinks, supra note 77, at 498
(observing that it is “settled beyond question” that conduct such as torture and genocide
violates customary international law).
105 See, e.g., Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir. 1995); Cohen v.
Hartman, 634 F.2d 318, 319–20 (5th Cir. Unit B Jan. 1981).
106 See, e.g., Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276, 280 (S.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that “a
violation of the First Amendment right of free speech” is not actionable under the ATS).
But see Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1262–64 (N.D. Ala.
2003) (finding that interference with the “rights to associate and organize” may be
actionable).
107 See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888 n.23 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that
even “‘wilful’ negligence[ ] does not constitute a law of nations violation” (quoting Benja-
mins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 916 (2d Cir. 1978))); Goodman & Jinks,
supra note 77, at 509 (observing that certain claims “fall outside the well-accepted scope of
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Moreover, the Court could have supplemented this broad stan-
dard with rules to guide lower courts in adjudicating ATS cases.  (As
noted below, the Court has adopted this approach in other contexts,
when a particular area of law seems less compatible with bright-line
rules.)108  For example, given the Court’s stated concerns about inter-
ference with the political branches, it could have clarified the extent
to which lower courts should defer to the Executive Branch in ATS
cases.  The Court might have created a presumption in favor of defer-
ence whenever the Executive Branch claims that a particular suit
would interfere with a preexisting foreign policy concern, such as the
United States’ support for South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation
Commission.  A plaintiff could rebut that presumption by demonstrat-
ing that the Executive Branch has no established policy on the issue
but is merely asserting a litigation position.
I do not mean to suggest that the above standard or the accompa-
nying deference rule constituted the Court’s only (or its best) options
once it concluded that some human rights claims were actionable
under the ATS.  I seek only to illustrate that the Court could have
done far more than decide the case before it.  But, as Judge William
Fletcher aptly observed, even after Sosa, this “area of law . . . still cries
out for clarification from the Supreme Court.”109
C. Institutional Considerations
Minimalism has been defended in large measure on institutional
grounds, particularly as a means of reducing judicial decision costs
and error costs.110  As the above examples suggest, however, once we
take the entire judiciary into account, it is doubtful that minimalism
can be justified on this basis.  Indeed, these institutional considera-
tions do not appear to clearly support either minimalism or vertical
maximalism.
When the Supreme Court issues a minimalist opinion, it transfers
decision costs to the lower courts.  For example, lower federal courts
have struggled to apply the Court’s minimalist test for federal ques-
tion jurisdiction over state law claims (most recently articulated in Gra-
ble).111  As noted, appellate courts have reportedly reversed district
court applications of this standard at a far higher rate (65 percent)
than they have reversed other lower court decisions (12 percent).112
federal [customary international law],” including “expropriation of property, fraud, . . .
free speech, libel, child custody law, and financial misconduct” (footnotes omitted)).
108 See infra notes 160–62 and accompanying text.
109 Fletcher, supra note 97, at 671.
110 See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text (discussing institutional justifications
for minimalism).
111 See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.
112 See Note, supra note 53.
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Although these figures may be imperfect,113 they do suggest that the
Court’s minimalist approach has increased overall decision costs for
the inferior federal courts.  The Court’s approach may have also in-
creased total error costs, at least if the lower courts issue more “erro-
neous” than “correct” rulings (a measure that depends on how one
defines an “error” in this context).114
Likewise, the lower federal and state courts have struggled with
the minimalist plurality decision in Baze.  As Justice Stevens observed,
the plurality decision leaves “open” the validity of “a similar three-
drug protocol . . . in other States.”115  For example, challenges have
been raised in federal and state courts in Virginia, Texas, and Dela-
ware.  In each case, while the State has contended that its lethal injec-
tion protocol mirrors that of Kentucky, death row inmates have
vigorously highlighted the differences, urging that the state’s proce-
dures lack the safeguards the plurality noted in Kentucky.116  Clearly,
the Baze decision has increased decision costs—particularly litigation
costs—for the lower courts.117  And it may also increase error costs,
depending on the direction of the lower court decisions and on
whether “error” is defined as a victory for the inmate or as a victory for
the State that leads to the inmate’s execution.
Notably, the Supreme Court has various institutional advantages
over the inferior federal and state courts that may make it more effi-
cient for the Court to incur these decision costs itself.  Because the
Court has almost complete control over its docket, it can spend more
time on each case than a court of appeals with mandatory appellate
jurisdiction118 or a single district court judge, who may process several
hundred cases in a given year.119
113 See Meltzer, supra note 50, at 1913 (noting that the study examined only “reported
appeals”).
114 In institutional terms, an “error” depends on a given individual’s jurisprudential
theory or set of values. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITU-
TIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 77 (2006) (observing that “people might dis-
pute” what constitutes a “mistake[ ]” or an “injustice[ ],” given that “[o]ne person’s error
might be another’s fidelity to law”).
115 Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1542 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment).
116 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
117 Cf. VERMEULE, supra note 114, at 166–67 (noting that “‘[d]ecision costs’ is a broad
rubric that might encompass the direct (out-of-pocket) costs of litigation to litigants and
the judicial bureaucracy” as well as “the costs to lower courts of implementing and applying
doctrines developed at higher levels”).
118 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2006) (providing the Supreme Court with discretion-
ary certiorari jurisdiction), with 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (“The courts of appeals . . . shall have
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . .
except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.”).
119 See infra note 306 (providing statistics on the large caseload in the federal district
courts).
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\95-1\CRN104.txt unknown Seq: 23  3-NOV-09 10:57
2009] THE STRUCTURAL CASE FOR VERTICAL MAXIMALISM 23
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has informational advantages
over the lower federal and state courts.  As many commentators have
observed, the Court (like all judicial bodies) lacks the fact-finding and
information-gathering capacities of a legislature.120  The Court cannot
hold hearings and consult those who may be affected by a particular
legal rule, as can Congress.121  But, as compared to the lower courts,
the Supreme Court has substantial informational advantages.  First,
the Court is less dependent on the parties to frame the issues in the
case.  The Court can (and often does) modify the questions presented
in a certiorari petition, directing the parties to address an issue of law
that it has decided to consider.122  The Court can also rely on lower
court decisions that have analyzed a legal issue, particularly if it de-
clines to grant certiorari until the issue has “percolated” among a
number of lower courts.123  And, in most cases, the Court receives
amicus briefs that supplement the information provided by the par-
ties.124 Sosa offers an example: the Court did not take up an ATS case
until twenty-four years after the Filartiga decision.  When it did inter-
vene, it received multiple briefs from amici supporting each side of
the litigation.125
These informational advantages may help the Court overcome
what scholars have described as the potentially distorting effects of
litigation.  A growing literature, drawing in large part on the behav-
120 See, e.g., Devins & Meese, supra note 27, at 327 (noting that “[u]nlike legislators,
who can . . . hold[ ] hearings, tak[e] polls, . . . and visit[ ] constituents,” “judges are con-
fined to ‘the record’” in the case).
121 See A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme
Court’s New “On the Record” Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 328,
385–87 (2001) (discussing congressional fact-finding methods); supra note 120.
122 See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 128 S. Ct. 1702, 1702–03 (2008) (directing the parties
to brief and argue “[i]n addition to the questions presented by the petition . . . ‘Whether
the Court’s decision in Saucier v. Katz, [533 U.S. 194 (2001), which governed consideration
of qualified immunity claims] should be overruled?’”).
123 See Devins & Meese, supra note 27, at 354 (asserting that, by allowing issues to per-
colate in the lower courts, the Court can help ensure that when it takes up an issue, “it will
do so at a time when it is better positioned both to speak clearly and to make an informed
decision”); Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 915 (2006)
(stating that the Court can “delay[ ]” ruling on an issue “until there is a fair amount of
lower court experience”).
124 See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on
the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 744, 750 (2000) (reporting, based on their study
of Supreme Court cases from 1946 to 1995, that “[i]n recent years, one or more amicus
briefs have been filed in 85% of the Court’s argued cases” and noting the claim that ami-
cus briefs provide “valuable new information” to the Court).
125 The filings on Westlaw suggest that, at the merits stage in Sosa, the Court received
twelve amicus briefs supporting the respondent Alvarez (and thus asserting that new claims
should be allowed under the ATS).  The Court received four private amicus briefs, as well
as a brief from the United States, supporting the petitioner (and thus taking the opposite
position).  Notably, Joseph Kearney and Tom Merrill’s study suggests that the United States
is particularly influential when it files an amicus brief in the Supreme Court. See id. at
749–50.
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ioral sciences, has pointed out that judges are significantly affected by
the facts of the particular dispute before them.126  Such a tendency
can be problematic: in our common law system, any court decision
may serve as a precedent in a future case, and the particular facts
before the court may be unrepresentative of the larger group of cases
that its decision could affect.127  Some scholars, however, have argued
that the Supreme Court is less likely than lower courts to be driven by
the facts of the case before it (and thus less inclined to make this type
of “error”).  The Supreme Court can consider the various factual sce-
narios that have arisen in the lower courts as well as any hypotheticals
offered by the parties and amici and should thus be more able to fo-
cus on abstract legal questions.128
Once we take into account the institutional differences between
the Supreme Court and the lower courts, it is not clear that minimal-
ism can be justified on institutional grounds (that is, as a means of
reducing overall decision costs and error costs).  But I also do not
claim that such considerations necessarily support vertical maximal-
ism.  First, although the Supreme Court may be less subject than lower
courts to the distorting effects of litigation, it is hardly immune from
those effects.129  The above behavioral science research may simply
suggest that all courts should be wary of issuing broad decisions that
extend beyond the facts of a particular case.  Alternatively, this re-
search might suggest that the Supreme Court should issue such deci-
sions only when it requires all lower courts to defer to democratic
institutions (which are less subject to these cognitive biases).130  Al-
though few scholars have asserted that the Court should never issue
126 See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial
Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 784 (2001) (finding, based on their study of 167 federal
magistrates, that cognitive biases “influenced [those judges’] decision-making processes”);
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Bottom-Up Versus Top-Down Lawmaking, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 933, 941
(2006) (noting that “[a]spects of an individual case that . . . invoke sympathy” may affect
judicial decisions).
127 See Schauer, supra note 123, at 884 (arguing that this psychological research calls
into question “the entire ‘merit’ of lawmaking in common law fashion”).
128 See, e.g., Devins & Meese, supra note 27, at 354–55 (noting that the Court can, to
some degree, compensate for the distorting effects of litigation by letting issues percolate
and then relying on information in lower court rulings).
129 See id. at 336–51 (urging that the Court’s affirmative action and Establishment
Clause cases reflect these cognitive biases); Schauer, supra note 123, at 903 (asserting that
“the problem exists even in the Supreme Court”).
130 See VERMEULE, supra note 114, at 4 (arguing in favor of majoritarianism largely on
institutional grounds).  Legislatures are less subject to the case-centered cognitive biases
that affect courts because, in enacting statutes, they do not typically have before them only
a single factual scenario. Cf. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Rulemaking Versus Adjudication: A Psycho-
logical Perspective, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 529, 538 (2005) (“[A]djudication necessarily entails
a single-case perspective, which might blind the decisionmaker to the broader policy
implications.”).
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broad rulings that restrain legislatures,131 that is arguably the implica-
tion of this research.
Second, vertical maximalism could, overtime, impair some of the
Supreme Court’s current informational advantages over the lower fed-
eral and state courts.  If the Court adopted a presumption in favor of
maximalism, its broad decisions should govern a number of cases in
the lower courts.  But that very process might also (at least in some
contexts) inhibit development of new legal theories in the lower
courts and thereby undermine their capacity to serve as informational
resources for the Supreme Court.132
Finally, it is not at all clear that concentrating decision-making
authority in the Supreme Court would reduce overall error costs.  Be-
cause a Supreme Court decision binds all lower federal and state
courts, any “incorrect” decision would have a dramatic, national im-
pact.  And those error costs would be particularly pronounced in the
context of a maximal decision, which is designed to govern a large
number of cases in the lower courts.  Thus, while a minimalist opinion
might lead to a larger number of “errors” (given the potential for error
in the lower courts), an error in a vertically maximal decision would
be far more severe.
It is difficult to say in the abstract (that is, absent empirical find-
ings) whether these institutional considerations, on balance, favor ver-
tical maximalism or minimalism.  In my view, however, we do not
need to rely solely on conjecture about institutional capacities or
about the ways in which these decision costs and error costs might—if
we could find a way of empirically measuring these effects—ultimately
play out.133  None of these institutional considerations casts doubt
upon the central claim here: the scope (that is, breadth or narrow-
ness) of Supreme Court opinions serves, in different ways, to allocate
decision-making authority within the judiciary.134  Nor do these con-
siderations cast doubt upon my claim that, to ensure the proper distri-
131 As discussed, some scholars have criticized minimalism, precisely because it dis-
courages the Court from issuing broad decisions on important questions of constitutional
law. See supra notes 27–31 and accompanying text.
132 Indeed, Justice Samuel Alito recently noted the (potentially) endogenous effects of
the Court’s capital punishment jurisprudence. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641,
2665–66 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting) (asserting that Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977),
which invalidated the death penalty for the rape of an adult woman, “stunted legislative
consideration of the question whether the death penalty” might be valid for the “targeted
offense” of child rape, in part because many state courts had construed Coker to preclude
the death penalty for all rape crimes).
133 Cf. John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Statutory Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 685, 686 (1999) (“[I]t is perhaps premature to pronounce that the only, or even the
most important, remaining assessment of formalism is factual.”).
134 Cf. VERMEULE, supra note 114, at 68 (“The choice of legal form has important ef-
fects on the allocation of decisionmaking authority.”).
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bution of authority in our current judiciary, the Court should employ
vertical maximalism.
D. Precedent as a Means of Allocating Decision-Making
Responsibility
As Fred Schauer has persuasively argued, judicial precedents
serve to allocate authority among judicial institutions.135  Although
Professor Schauer applies this theory temporally (noting the ways in
which past judicial decisions can bind future courts),136 his analysis
also applies to the allocation of decision-making responsibility among
courts within a judicial hierarchy.137
The binding effect of any judicial precedent depends principally
on two (related) factors.138  First, it depends on the breadth of the
precedent.  As Professor Schauer explains, “[a]lthough it will always
be possible to distinguish a precedent, this becomes comparatively
harder if” the precedent is characterized “in general terms.”139
“[T]he breadth of the description in the first case substantially limits
135 See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 182–83 (1991).
136 See id.; Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 576 (1987).
137 The effectiveness of precedent setting, of course, depends on the willingness of
lower courts to comply with Supreme Court decisions.  For purposes of this analysis, I as-
sume that lower courts do endeavor to abide by the Court’s rulings—an assumption that is
supported by some empirical evidence. See, e.g., John Gruhl, The Supreme Court’s Impact on
the Law of Libel: Compliance by Lower Federal Courts, 33 W. POL. Q. 502, 517–19 (1980) (find-
ing substantial lower court compliance with the Court’s libel decisions); Donald R. Songer,
The Impact of the Supreme Court on Trends in Economic Policy Making in the United States Courts of
Appeals, 49 J. POL. 830, 838–39 (1987) (finding compliance with labor and antitrust deci-
sions).  This assumption also accords with the observations of other scholars. See, e.g., San-
ford Levinson, On Positivism and Potted Plants: “Inferior” Judges and the Task of Constitutional
Interpretation, 25 CONN. L. REV. 843, 847 (1993) (“‘Inferior’ judges know their place, as it
were, which is the enforcement of the decisions of superiors, whatever their own views.”).
138 As noted, I do not seek to determine what constitutes the “holding” versus “dicta”
in a judicial precedent. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.  But a presumption in
favor of vertical maximalism should not require the Supreme Court to dispense with the
distinction.  When the Court declares a broad principle to decide a case, such as the tri-
mester framework in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973), that broad (maximal) prin-
ciple is generally viewed as part of the holding of the case.  But that does not mean there is
no distinction between holding and dicta.  For example, if the Court heard an antitrust
case involving horizontal price fixing, it might issue a broad (maximal) holding prohibit-
ing all such conduct.  But if the Court went on in that case to opine about the validity of
vertical resale price maintenance agreements, that discussion would be dicta because the
latter issue would be in no way presented by the case.  For discussions of the distinction
between holding and dicta, see Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57
STAN. L. REV. 953, 1065 (2005) (“A holding consists of those propositions along the chosen
decisional path or paths of reasoning that (1) are actually decided, (2) are based upon the
facts of the case, and (3) lead to the judgment.  If not a holding, a proposition stated in a
case counts as dicta.”); Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 1998
(1994) (advocating “a view of the holding/dictum distinction that attributes special signifi-
cance to the rationales of prior cases, rather than just their facts and outcomes”).
139 Schauer, supra note 136, at 594.
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possible distinguishing factors in subsequent cases.”140  Thus, for ex-
ample, if the Court adopted the Holmes test for federal question juris-
diction, its breadth (precluding federal question jurisdiction over all
state law claims) would make it difficult for lower federal courts to
deviate from that rule, and thereby ensure its status as binding
precedent.
Second, the constraining effect of a precedent depends on which
court determines the scope of the precedent.  In other words, the pre-
cedent-setting court must itself define its precedent as broad.  But if
the Supreme Court establishes “no [such] generalization,” then lower
federal and state courts must do their best to make sense of the
Court’s decision.141  The lower courts thus have substantial discretion
to apply the Supreme Court’s decision as they see fit.142
Lower court litigation in the wake of Sosa illustrates this point.  As
discussed, the Supreme Court in Sosa admonished lower courts to be
“wary of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive
Branches in managing foreign affairs,” suggesting that it might make
sense at some point to adopt “a policy of case-specific deference to the
political branches.”143  The Court noted in particular the federal gov-
ernment’s opposition to several ATS suits against corporations that
operated in apartheid-era South Africa, stating that “[i]n such cases,
there is a strong argument that federal courts should give serious
weight to the Executive Branch’s view of the case’s impact on foreign
policy.”144
Following Sosa, the district court overseeing the apartheid-era liti-
gation dismissed the ATS claims, relying in large part on the Supreme
Court’s stated concerns about deference to the Executive Branch.145
A divided appellate panel, however, vacated and remanded.146  On
the deference question, the majority stated that it “[took] the Su-
preme Court’s language in footnote 21 of Sosa at face value, as simply
observing that there is a strong argument that the [foreign policy]
views of the Executive Branch . . . should be given ‘serious weight.’”147
140 Id. at 594–95.
141 See SCHAUER, supra note 135, at 184 (noting that, if “the first (precedent) case con-
tains no generalization, the decision-maker in the second (instant) case creates the gener-
alization at that time”).
142 See id. (stating that a process that allows the second court to determine the mean-
ing of the first court’s precedent “is substantially non-constraining”).
143 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727, 733 n.21 (2004).
144 Id. at 733 n.21.
145 See Ntsebeza v. Daimler AG (In re S. African Apartheid Litig.), 346 F. Supp. 2d 538,
553–54 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting the federal government’s claim that the suit would cause
“tension” with South Africa and stating that “[a]s the Sosa Court made clear, these opinions
as to the foreign relations consequences of this action certainly deserve great weight”).
146 See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 264 (2d Cir. 2007).
147 Id. at 261 n.9 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21).
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But, the majority concluded, “summary dismissal at the behest of a
footnote [would be] premature.”148  The Court denied certiorari.149
The Supreme Court’s commentary on deference in Sosa had little
binding force as precedent because the Court did not purport to de-
cide the question.  Indeed, the Court stated (in minimalist fashion)
that a policy of deference was just one “possible limitation [on future
claims] that we need not apply here.”150  The lower federal courts ac-
cordingly had to do their best to make sense of the Supreme Court’s
opinion and, as it turned out, disagreed sharply over what the Court
had in mind.  By contrast, if the Court had adopted the rule suggested
above (a presumption in favor of deference to any preexisting Execu-
tive Branch policy), both lower courts would likely have agreed on the
resolution of the case: dismissal of the apartheid-era litigation.  I do
not mean to suggest that the Supreme Court should have adopted
that particular rule of deference.  But any such maximal approach
would have offered far more guidance to the lower courts.  The
Court’s minimalist opinion, by contrast, delegated its law-declaration
function on the deference question to the inferior federal courts.
This discussion suggests a fundamental distinction between a
minimalist and a vertically maximal approach to opinion writing.
When the Court issues a minimalist decision, it leaves much to be de-
cided by the lower federal and state courts.  Vertical maximalism, by
contrast, is specifically designed to create broad and binding prece-
dents that concentrate decision-making responsibility in the Supreme
Court.
Of course, the practical impact of the Court’s approach to opin-
ion writing depends on its capacity to review lower court decisions.  If
the Court served as a “court of error” that could review all (or even
most) lower court applications of its precedents, then it would make
far less difference how broadly or narrowly it wrote the initial opinion.
If a lower court misread a Supreme Court precedent or otherwise
erred in a determination of federal law, the Court could correct that
mistake on subsequent review (as long as it had appellate jurisdiction
over the matter).  As discussed in Part III, however, the Supreme
Court no longer has the capacity to conduct such case-by-case error
correction.  Accordingly, in our current judiciary, a minimalist Su-
148 Id.
149 The Court stated that, after four Justices recused themselves, it lacked a quorum to
rule on the matter. See Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424, 2424 (2008)
(mem.).  On remand, the district court permitted several claims against the corporations
to go forward, noting in part the court of appeals’ admonition that “footnote 21 [in Sosa]
merely provides guidance concerning the need for deference with regard to foreign policy
matters” and “does not mandate summary dismissal of this case.”  Ntsebeza v. Daimler AG
(In re S. African Apartheid Litig.), 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
150 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21.
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preme Court opinion serves to delegate substantial decision-making
responsibility to the Court’s judicial inferiors.
E. Not an Old Debate in a New Package
The debate between vertical maximalism and minimalism may re-
semble, in some respects, the familiar debate over rules and stan-
dards.151  Indeed, several policy arguments from the rules/standards
debate do appear to carry over.  For example, because maximal deci-
sions are designed to resolve a range of cases, they tend (much like
legal rules) to make the law more certain and predictable.152  By con-
trast, minimalist decisions (like legal standards) provide far less clar-
ity, but precisely for that reason, they permit lower courts to fashion
an outcome that is arguably more suited to a particular case.153
Moreover, the rules/standards debate also implicates the specific
issue of concern here: the allocation of authority among institutions.
As Professor Schauer has argued, a “lawmaker” can constrain the dis-
cretion of a “law-applier” by formulating a legal directive as a rule.154
Professor Schauer has applied this argument to the allocation of
power between legislatures and courts.155  As Adrian Vermeule has ob-
served, however, the analysis also applies to the allocation of authority
within a judicial hierarchy.156  Thus, under this theory, the Supreme
Court can retain its decision-making authority over a broader range of
cases by issuing decisions in the form of rules.
But, for several reasons, a preference for vertical maximalism is
not (and cannot be) simply a preference for rules over standards.
First, rules and standards differ in scope.157  A legal rule may be quite
narrow, perhaps limited to specific facts.  For example, the Court’s
holding in Grable could be recast as a narrow legal rule: a federal court
has federal question jurisdiction over a state quiet-title action that de-
151 For a sample of the vast literature on the debate over rules and standards, see Louis
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 562–63 (1992) (con-
tending that rules impose more costs ex ante, while standards require more effort ex post);
Sullivan, supra note 43, at 95–96 (asserting that the choice between rules and standards
“resembles . . . that between legal codes and the common law”).
152 See SCHAUER, supra note 135, at 137–38 (noting that rules make it easier for people
to plan their activities).
153 See Sullivan, supra note 43, at 62–63, 66 (observing that “[s]tandards produce un-
certainty” and can thus “chill[ ] socially productive behavior,” but can also “allow deci-
sionmakers to treat like cases that are substantively alike”).
154 See SCHAUER, supra note 135, at 159 (urging that rules “operate as tools for the
allocation of power”).
155 See Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 645,
686–88 (1991).
156 See VERMEULE, supra note 114, at 68 (“Rules and standards allocate decisionmaking
authority in different ways . . . between different levels of a hierarchical institution . . . .”).
157 See id. at 69 (noting that “[b]oth rules and standards can be broad or narrow”).
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pends on the meaning of federal tax law.158  Likewise, much of the
Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence consists of fact-bound de-
cisions that could be characterized as narrow rules.159  Such narrow
decisions offer little guidance to lower courts in future cases with even
marginally different facts and thus clearly fall on the minimalist end
of the opinion-writing spectrum.
Conversely, the Court can provide far more guidance to lower
courts—as demanded by maximalism—by employing a broad opera-
tive standard.  Indeed, in some contexts, that may be the only verti-
cally maximal option.  Some areas of the law are not conducive to
bright-line rules.160  The Court can nevertheless provide guidance to
lower courts by crafting a broad substantive standard (as suggested for
ATS cases) or a burden-shifting framework (as the Court has done in
the employment-discrimination context) to govern a wide range of
cases.161  Notably, the Court can supplement such a framework with
procedural rules akin to the deference rule suggested for ATS cases.
For example, in the employment-discrimination context, the Court
has created a strong presumption in favor of attorney’s fees for suc-
cessful plaintiffs.162
Moreover, the rules/standards terminology may tend to obscure
other methods that the Court can employ to render its opinion more
or less minimalist.  Whether the Supreme Court chooses a rule or a
standard, the Court can limit the precedential impact of that opera-
158 See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314–15,
320 (2005).
159 See, e.g., McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 850, 881 (2005) (inval-
idating a Ten Commandments display at a county courthouse); Van Orden v. Perry, 545
U.S. 677, 691–92 (2005) (upholding a Ten Commandments display on state capitol
grounds); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 614,
621 (1989) (invalidating a cre`che display at a county courthouse but upholding the display
of a menorah near a Christmas tree); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (uphold-
ing a cre`che display).  Notably, in this context, there are more maximal alternatives. Com-
pare Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 708 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (urging that, “at the very least, the
Establishment Clause has created a strong presumption against the display of religious
symbols on public property”), with McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 889, 893–94 & n.4 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (suggesting that religious displays are generally constitutional, as long as
they do not favor a specific religious sect).
160 Cf. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1186–87 (1989) (recognizing that legal standards cannot “be entirely avoided” but
“urg[ing] . . . that [they] be avoided where possible”).
161 See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–53 (1981) (stating
that, in an employment-discrimination action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the
plaintiff must first show a “prima facie case of discrimination.  Second, if the plaintiff suc-
ceeds . . . , the burden shifts to the defendant ‘to articulate some legitimate, nondiscrimi-
natory reason for the [adverse action].’  Third, should the defendant carry this burden, the
plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove . . . that the legitimate reasons offered . . .
were a pretext for discrimination” (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802–04 (1973))).
162 See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416–17 (1978).
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tive doctrine by sending mixed messages about how it should apply.
For example, in Sosa, the Court announced that lower courts could
recognize new claims under the ATS if the claims met a certain level
of specificity but then declared that “[t]his requirement of clear defi-
nition” was not “the only principle limiting” new claims.163  Likewise,
in Baze, the plurality stated that litigants could challenge other lethal
injection protocols by offering evidence of a reasonable alternative
but also suggested that few inmates would ever produce enough such
evidence to obtain a stay of execution.164  Such internal inconsisten-
cies undermine the constraining effect of any Supreme Court prece-
dent because they allow a lower court interpreting that precedent to
decide which statement to treat as binding.  In other words, the lower
court—rather than the Supreme Court itself—has the authority to de-
termine the scope of the Court’s precedent.  Such equivocation
thereby undercuts the constraining effect of any operative doctrine,
whether formulated as a rule or as a standard.  It may therefore be
more useful to consider the overall precedential impact of a deci-
sion—a concept that is better captured by the terms minimalism and
maximalism.
Admittedly, there is an affinity between vertical maximalism and
rules.  The Court can provide lower federal and state courts with more
guidance by issuing decisions in the form of broad rules.  Accordingly,
when the Court has a choice between articulating its operative doc-
trine as a broad rule versus a standard, it should favor the more rule-
like formulation.
But, for the reasons noted above, a rigid focus on rules would
obscure the central point.  The principal issue is not whether the
Court has chosen a rule or a standard but rather the extent to which
its precedent serves to bind—and thus to guide—the lower courts.
Such guidance is necessary, not to ensure rule-like clarity in the law,
but to ensure the proper distribution of decision-making responsibil-
ity within our hierarchical judiciary.
II
A HIERARCHICAL JUDICIARY
The Supreme Court’s constitutional relationship with the lower
federal and state courts has increasingly become an area of scholarly
interest.  Scholars have not, however, reached a consensus.  Although
many commentators assert that Article III creates a hierarchical fed-
eral judiciary,165 others contend that the Constitution does not man-
163 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732, 733 n.21 (2004).
164 See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1532, 1537 (2008).
165 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Some Opinions on the Opinion Clause, 82 VA. L. REV. 647,
668–69 & n.92 (1996) (asserting that the Constitution creates a hierarchical judiciary);
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date any particular federal judicial structure.166  There is also some
(albeit less) disagreement over the Supreme Court’s role vis-a`-vis state
courts.  Most scholars conclude that the Supreme Court may instruct
state courts on the interpretation and implementation of federal
law.167  But a few commentators have expressed doubt that state
courts are constitutionally required to abide by Supreme Court
decisions.168
As discussed below, I believe that the Constitution’s text and
structure (buttressed, to some degree, by historical evidence) support
the hierarchical construction.169  Notably, this position appears to be
gaining strength among legal scholars.  But I wish to focus on an im-
plication of that hierarchical structure that scholars have thus far
failed to appreciate.  While many commentators have examined what
Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 324, 362
(2006) (concluding that the hierarchical view is “more plausible”); Steven G. Calabresi &
Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textu-
alist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1007 (2007) (arguing that “the
weight of textual, intratextual, and structural arguments points toward a hierarchical fed-
eral judiciary”); Caminker, supra note 36, at 829 n.49, 832–34 (“[T]he proposition that
Article III commands all inferior courts to obey Supreme Court precedent appears quite
powerful.”); Laurence Claus, The One Court that Congress Cannot Take Away: Singularity,
Supremacy, and Article III, 96 GEO. L.J. 59, 70–71 (2007) (agreeing with the hierarchical
view); Charles Fried, Impudence, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 155, 189–90 (“The Supreme Court has
the hierarchical authority to set the law for lower courts.”); James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-
Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1433,
1453 (2000) (urging that the Court is “the hierarchical leader of the judicial department”).
166 See, e.g., Bhagwat, supra note 26, at 982–85 (contending that the Constitution does
not require a hierarchical federal judiciary); William S. Dodge, Note, Congressional Control
of Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction: Why the Original Jurisdiction Clause Suggests an “Essential
Role”, 100 YALE L.J. 1013, 1029–30 (1991) (same); David E. Engdahl, What’s in a Name?  The
Constitutionality of Multiple “Supreme” Courts, 66 IND. L.J. 457, 503–04 (1991) (same); see also
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing Justice: Some Variations on the Themes of Robert M. Cover’s
Justice Accused, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 33, 82–88 (1989) (urging that lower courts can initially
disregard “clearly erroneous” constitutional interpretations).
167 See, e.g., Frederic M. Bloom, State Courts Unbound, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 501, 503
(2008) (agreeing with the widely held view that “state courts must abide Supreme Court
doctrine on questions of federal law”); Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, Equity and Hier-
archy: Reflections on the Harris Execution, 102 YALE L.J. 255, 276 n.106 (1992) (urging that
state courts have an “obligation to follow Supreme Court precedent in all cases”); Fried,
supra note 165; James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitu-
tionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 199 (2007) (asserting that
state courts “must remain subordinate to the Supreme Court” on federal issues); see also
Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, 1982 U.
ILL. L. REV. 387, 390 (contending that the Court’s constitutional decisions “are at least a
form of federal common law” and “are binding federal law under the supremacy clause”).
168 See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 36, at 837–38 (doubting that “state courts [must]
obey Supreme Court federal law precedents”); see also Paulsen, supra note 166, at 84–88
(urging that state courts can initially disregard “clearly erroneous” constitutional
interpretations).
169 For a discussion of the widely accepted practice of making inferences from consti-
tutional structure, see CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 7–32 (1969).
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this structure might mean for lower courts or for Congress (particu-
larly with respect to its authority to regulate Supreme Court jurisdic-
tion), few have considered the implications of this scheme for the
Court itself.  I assert that this hierarchical structure gives the Court a
“supreme” role in defining the content of federal law for the judiciary
and that the current Supreme Court cannot effectively perform this
constitutional responsibility unless it issues vertically maximal
decisions.
A. Text and Structure
Article III vests the “judicial Power of the United States” in “one
supreme Court[ ] and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish.”170  Article I, in turn, autho-
rizes Congress “[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme
Court,”171 thereby indicating that any such “inferior” courts are “infer-
ior” in relation to the “supreme” Court.172
These two provisions, taken together, suggest that the terms “su-
preme” and “inferior” establish some sort of constitutional relation-
ship between the Supreme Court and the inferior federal courts.
Standing alone, however, these provisions do not tell us what type of
relationship.  At the Founding, the terms “inferior” and “supreme”
could convey two possible meanings: the “inferior” was either
“subordinate to” or (in some other respect) lesser in rank or impor-
tance than the “supreme” tribunal.173  An inferior court might be “less
important” if, for example, it had a less extensive geographic or sub-
ject matter jurisdiction than the “supreme” court.174
Notably, these definitions are not incompatible.  The inferior fed-
eral courts could be both “subordinate to” and “less important” than
the Supreme Court.  But only the former construction conveys a hier-
archical relationship.  Thus, as Amy Barrett has observed, the question
170 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
171 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (emphasis added).
172 Notably, as Dean Evan Caminker has explained, the designation of one court as
“supreme” and others as “inferior” also suggests that these courts exercise the “judicial
Power” in different ways. See Evan Caminker, Allocating the Judicial Power in a “Unified Judici-
ary”, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1513, 1515 (2000) (urging that courts “enjoy somewhat different
packages of judicial power . . . depending on their . . . placement” in the “hierarchical
Article III system”).
173 See 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1756) (defining
“inferiour” to mean “1. Lower in place. 2. Lower in station or rank of life . . . 3. Lower in
value or excellency . . . 4. Subordinate”); 2 JOHNSON, supra (defining “supreme” as “1.
Highest in dignity; highest in authority . . . 2. Highest; most excellent”).
174 See Engdahl, supra note 166, at 475 n.95 (asserting that it was “common” in eight-
eenth-century England and the states “to describe one tribunal as inferior” to another for
various reasons, including “lesser subject matter or geographic competence”).
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is whether Article III uses the term “inferior”—in conjunction with
“supreme”—at least in part to denote a subordinate.175
The constitutional structure appears to answer that question.
The Constitution uses the term “supreme” in only one other context:
the Supremacy Clause of Article VI.176  There seems to be little doubt
that this provision establishes a hierarchical relationship between fed-
eral law and state law.  Indeed, the Court has declared that the
Supremacy Clause “unambiguously provides” that federal law is “supe-
rior to that of the States”177 and that state law is “subordinate.”178  The
Supremacy Clause thus offers considerable support for the hierarchi-
cal construction of “supreme” and “inferior” in Article III.
The Constitution likewise uses the term “inferior” in only one
other context: the Appointments Clause of Article II, which estab-
lishes the process by which “principal” and “inferior” officers are ap-
pointed to the Executive Branch.179  Although the Court has not
consistently construed the term “inferior” for purposes of this provi-
sion,180 its most recent articulation supports the hierarchical construc-
tion of Article III.  In Edmond v. United States,181 the Court stated that,
“[g]enerally speaking, the term ‘inferior officer’ connotes a relation-
175 See Barrett, supra note 165, at 346–47 (noting that the alternative definition based
on “relative rank” “is important . . . only insofar as it permits one to [reject the hierarchical
view] without depriving the terms of content”).
176 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”).
177 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 29 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
178 Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal. v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 544 (1958) (“‘It is of the
very essence of supremacy . . . to modify every power vested in subordinate governments, as
to exempt its own operations from their own influence.’” (quoting M’Culloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427 (1819))).
179 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States . . .
but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”).
The Court has distinguished “principal” and “inferior” officers, holding that the latter
need not be appointed by the President (with the approval of the Senate) pursuant to the
Appointments Clause. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976).
180 In Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), the Court upheld the Ethics in Govern-
ment Act of 1978, which authorized the appointment of an independent counsel, based in
part on its conclusion that the independent counsel was an “inferior” officer under the
Appointments Clause. See id. at  670–71, 696–97.  The Court reasoned that, “[a]lthough
[an independent counsel] may not be ‘subordinate’ to the Attorney General (and the
President) insofar as she possesses a degree of independent discretion . . . , the fact that
she can be removed by the Attorney General indicates that she is to some degree ‘inferior’
in rank and authority.” Id. at 671.  The Court thereby suggested that an officer can be
“inferior” under the Appointments Clause even if she is not “subordinate” to the President
or any other higher-ranking executive official.  For further discussion of Morrison, see infra
note 182.
181 520 U.S. 651 (1997).
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ship with some higher ranking officer or officers below the President:
Whether one is an ‘inferior’ officer depends on whether he has a
superior.”182
Furthermore, the constitutional text and structure suggest that
the Court is “supreme” not only with respect to lower federal courts
but also in relation to state courts (on matters of federal law).  The
Supremacy Clause provides that “[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all
Treaties made . . . under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land.”183  The Clause further requires “the
Judges in every State” to abide by such federal law “any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”184
This provision seems to suggest that there should be some mechanism
for ensuring that state courts adhere to federal law.
Article III’s Appellate Jurisdiction Clause provides one mecha-
nism.  Article III gives the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over
certain types of cases, but states that, “[i]n all . . . other Cases” covered
by the federal “judicial Power,” the Court “shall have appellate Juris-
diction.”185  Notably, in defining those “other cases,” Article III mir-
rors the text of the Supremacy Clause, stating that “[t]he judicial
Power shall extend to all Cases . . . arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made . . . under their Author-
ity.”186  Article III accordingly seems to authorize Supreme Court re-
view of state court decisions to ensure that they comply with federal
law.
The Supremacy Clause and the Appellate Jurisdiction Clause,
taken together, offer “good evidence” that the Supreme Court has hi-
erarchical authority over state courts on matters of federal law.187
182 Id. at 662; see also id. at 666 (holding that the judges of the Coast Guard Court of
Criminal Appeals were inferior officers and thus upholding a statute that provided for
their appointment by the Secretary of Transportation).  Although some scholars have sug-
gested that Edmond superseded Morrison, see Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 165, at 1018,
Edmond did not expressly overrule Morrison.  In any event, I need not resolve the precise
meaning of the term “inferior” in the Appointments Clause.  It seems reasonable, given the
consistent construction of the Supremacy Clause and the Court’s recent acknowledgement
that “inferior” “generally” refers to a subordinate, that, when used together, the terms
“supreme” and “inferior” connote a hierarchical relationship.
183 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
184 Id.
185 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall
have original Jurisdiction.  In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court
shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under
such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”).
186 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  Article III, of course, also authorizes federal courts to
hear admiralty matters as well as various party-based cases and controversies. See id.
187 See Barrett, supra note 165, at 354, 362 (observing that the Appellate Jurisdiction
Clause offers “good evidence that Article III envisions some sort of hierarchy,” given that it
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Moreover, the Appellate Jurisdiction Clause further supports the hier-
archical view of the federal judiciary since it authorizes Supreme
Court review of inferior federal court decisions as well.
To be sure, Article III provides that Congress may make
“[e]xceptions” to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.188  And,
as many scholars have observed, this provision has significant implica-
tions for Congress’s power to regulate federal jurisdiction.189  But,
whatever the implications for the jurisdiction-stripping debate (an is-
sue I bracket for now),190 the Appellate Jurisdiction Clause does offer
insight into the relationship between the Supreme Court and the
lower courts.  This Clause strongly suggests that the Court is “su-
preme” in determining the content of federal law, at least to the ex-
tent that it has appellate jurisdiction over a given area of federal law
(as it currently has over virtually every, if not every, federal question).
B. The Historical Record
The historical evidence from the Founding Era also provides
some support for the hierarchical construction.  The evidence per-
taining to state courts is fairly strong.  The historical record suggests
that the Supreme Court was created in part to ensure that state courts
complied with federal law.  For example, the records from the Consti-
tutional Convention indicate that the delegates debated the
Supremacy Clause and the Appellate Jurisdiction Clause around the
same time and specifically “tailored [Article III] to facilitate Supreme
Court enforcement of the supremacy clause.”191  Likewise, in The Fed-
“directly vests the Supreme Court with the jurisdiction to review the judgments of inferior
federal courts (and state courts)”).
188 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
189 Many federal courts scholars have concluded that the Exceptions Clause gives Con-
gress plenary power to remove cases from the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569, 1569 (1990)
(citing this as “the traditional view of article III”).  Some scholars have, however, suggested
limits.  Henry Hart and Leonard Ratner have focused on preserving the Supreme Court’s
“essential role” or “essential functions.” See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit
the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1365 (1953);
Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109
U. PA. L. REV. 157, 161 (1960) (urging that the Court must have the power to ensure the
uniformity and supremacy of federal law).  Other commentators have asserted that the
Exceptions Clause only allows Congress to move cases between the Court’s original and
appellate jurisdiction (a position that, they acknowledge, is at odds with Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)). See, e.g., Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 165, at
1036–43; Claus, supra note 165, at 77–80, 107.
190 See supra note 9 and accompanying text; see also Caminker, supra note 36, at 834
(noting that the Court’s constitutional relationship with lower courts is conceptually dis-
tinct from Congress’s power to regulate jurisdiction).
191 Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Limita-
tions on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17,
48–49 (1981) (summarizing the debates over the provisions); see Ratner, supra note 189, at
161–65 (same); see also LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTION-
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eralist, Alexander Hamilton and James Madison both asserted that the
Supreme Court would perform this function.192  Indeed, one scholar
has argued that the Court was designed to be “the principal instru-
mentality for implementing the supremacy clause.”193
The historical evidence pertaining to the Supreme Court’s rela-
tionship with inferior federal courts is more limited.  The records
from the Constitutional Convention say very little about the lower fed-
eral courts, undoubtedly in part because it was not clear that there
would be any such courts.  The Constitution expressly left it up to
Congress to determine whether to establish any inferior federal
courts.194
Nevertheless, there is historical evidence supporting the hierar-
chical construction.  As discussed, at the Founding, the terms “infer-
ior” and “supreme” could suggest that the “inferior” courts were
either “subordinate to” or (in some other respect) lesser in rank or
importance than the Supreme Court.195  Some contemporaneous evi-
dence suggests that the Framers used the terms in the former sense.196
For example, in Federalist 81, Hamilton asserted that Congress’s au-
thority to establish “tribunals INFERIOR TO THE ‘SUPREME COURT’”
ALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 75 (2004) (noting that the Convention delegates “include[d]
the Supremacy Clause as a way to ensure judicial review of state laws”).
192 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 36, at 150 (“To avoid
the confusion which would unavoidably result from the contradictory decisions of a num-
ber of independent [state] judicatories,” it was “necessary to establish one court para-
mount to the rest . . . and authorized to settle and declare in the last resort a uniform rule
of civil justice”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison), supra note 36, at 245–46 (con-
tending that the “tribunal” created by the Constitution would determine “the boundary
between” the national and state governments); THE FEDERALIST NO. 82 (Alexander Hamil-
ton), supra note 36, at 493–94 (“[T]he national and State systems are to be regarded as ONE
WHOLE.  The courts of the latter will . . . be natural auxiliaries to the execution of the laws
of the Union, and an appeal from them will as naturally lie to that tribunal [the Supreme
Court] which is destined to unite and assimilate the principles of national justice and the
rules of national decisions.”).
193 Ratner, supra note 189, at 165; see also Caminker, supra note 36, at 833 n.65 (“Even
ardent states-rights advocates at the Constitutional Convention conceded the propriety of
allowing Supreme Court review of state court decisions interpreting federal law.”).
194 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; Sager, supra note 191, at 48.
195 See supra notes 173–74 and accompanying text.
196 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 82 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 36, at 492 (read-
ing the Article III Vesting Clause as meaning that “the organs of the national judiciary
should be one Supreme Court, and as many subordinate courts as Congress should think
proper to appoint”); id. at 494 (discussing appeals “to the Supreme Court . . . from the
subordinate federal courts” and the state courts); John Jay, Draft of Letter from Justices of
the Supreme Court to George Washington (Sept. 15, 1790), reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION 161, 162 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (describing the
lower federal courts as “inferior and subordinate”); see also Letter from the Federal Farmer
(XV) (Jan. 18, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 315, 319–20 (Herbert J.
Storing ed., 1981) (indicating, in his discussion of “all civil causes carried up the supreme
court by appeals,” an assumption that Article III places the Supreme Court atop a hierar-
chical federal judiciary).
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would “enable the institution of local courts, subordinate to the Supreme,
either in States or larger districts.”197
A few scholars (most notably, David Engdahl) have, however,
amassed a good deal of historical evidence to dispute the hierarchical
position.198  Professor Engdahl emphasizes that, at the Founding, it
was “common to describe one tribunal as inferior ‘to’ another . . .
despite [the] lack of . . . appellate or supervisory lines.”199  For exam-
ple, in his influential Commentaries, William Blackstone referred to En-
glish courts as “inferior” and “supreme,” “without reference to
hierarchy.”200  Likewise, Professor Engdahl observes, colonial and
early state courts were often called “inferior” if they had a limited geo-
graphic or subject matter jurisdiction and “supreme” if their jurisdic-
tion was broader in scope.201  In fact, some states, including Virginia,
had multiple “supreme” courts.202
Professor Engdahl convincingly demonstrates that the terms “su-
preme” and “inferior” do not, standing alone, necessarily denote a
hierarchical structure.  But his evidence does not, in my view, clearly
refute the hierarchical construction.  As discussed, the Supreme Court
could be both “supreme” in the hierarchical sense (atop a judicial pyr-
amid) and in the jurisdictional sense (with the largest geographic
and/or subject matter jurisdiction).  Indeed, the Court has long been
“supreme” in both respects.
I do not mean to suggest that the historical evidence conclusively
establishes the hierarchical position.  The founding-era evidence per-
197 THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 36, at 485 n.* (emphasis
added).
198 Notably, Professor Engdahl focused on the Supreme Court’s relationship with the
lower federal courts, but his historical arguments about the meaning of “supreme” may
apply to the Court’s constitutional role more generally.
199 Engdahl, supra note 166, at 475 n.95.
200 Id. at 466 (“Americans’ best source of information about English law and practice
was Blackstone’s Commentaries.  It is significant, therefore, that Blackstone called courts ‘in-
ferior’ and ‘supreme’ without reference to hierarchy.” (footnote omitted)).  Of course, it is
not clear how much we can rely on the English judicial system in determining the meaning
of Article III. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 8 (2001) (“Our constitutional structure certainly drew upon prior English practice
in some respects, but it also departed from that practice in important respects.”).  Accord-
ing to Wilfred Ritz, the Framers sought to create a different judicial structure. See WILFRED
J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789: EXPOSING MYTHS, CHALLENG-
ING PREMISES, AND USING NEW EVIDENCE 41 (Wythe Holt & L.H. LaRue eds., 1990) (“The
English judicial system, with its plethora of courts, obscure jurisdictions, and unclear hier-
archical arrangements, was patently unsatisfactory, and was a model rather to be avoided
than emulated.”).
201 See Engdahl, supra note 166, at 468–72.  Professor Ritz has questioned the extent to
which the Founders sought to mimic the colonial and early state judiciaries. See RITZ, supra
note 200, at 35 (“[C]ontrary to what may be generally thought, the national judiciary was
not modeled on the then-existing judicial systems of the states . . . .”).
202 See Engdahl, supra note 166, at 469–72 (noting that Virginia had four “supreme”
courts in 1787).
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taining to the judiciary, particularly the federal judiciary, is sparse and
may not definitively support any position.  But, at the very least, the
historical record is mixed and does not negate the conclusion sug-
gested by the text and structure: the Constitution creates a hierarchi-
cal judiciary.
C. The Supreme Court’s Recognition of Its Constitutional Role
To the extent the Supreme Court has addressed the issue, it has
consistently reaffirmed that it sits atop a judicial hierarchy, with the
authority and the responsibility to guide lower courts on the content
of federal law.  Although the Court’s declarations about its constitu-
tional role may seem beside the point (and perhaps a bit self-serving)
in any discussion of Congress’s power over the judiciary, or in an ex-
amination of lower court obligation, these statements seem quite rele-
vant in an analysis of the Court’s own constitutional duties.  In Part
III, I discuss how the Court can most effectively fulfill its own concep-
tion of its “supreme” role.
The Court early on asserted its authority to issue binding con-
structions of federal law to state courts.  In Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,203
the Court considered a claim by Virginia’s highest court that it had no
obligation to enforce a Supreme Court decision.204  The Court made
clear that it had the constitutional authority to “revis[e] the decisions
of state tribunals” and that the court below had erred in “declin[ing]
to obey the mandate of the supreme court.”205  The Court reiterated
this theme in Cohens v. Virginia,206 emphasizing that its “exercise of the
appellate power over . . . State tribunals” was “essential” to ensuring
the supremacy of federal law.207
The Supreme Court has likewise repeatedly recognized its role as
the hierarchical leader of the federal judiciary.  The Court has de-
clared that “Article III creates[ ] not a batch of unconnected courts,
but a judicial department composed of ‘inferior Courts’ and ‘one su-
preme Court.’”208  “Within that hierarchy,”209 the Court has empha-
sized, it has the authority and the responsibility to define the content
of federal law for the “subordinate” federal courts.
Thus, in Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc.,210 the Court declared that,
under “the rules that necessarily govern our hierarchical federal court
system,” “[i]t is this Court’s responsibility to say what a statute means,
203 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
204 See id. at 323–24.
205 See id. at 345–46, 351–52, 362.
206 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
207 Id. at 414–15.
208 Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 227 (1995).
209 Id.
210 511 U.S. 298 (1994).
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and once the Court has spoken, it is the duty of other courts to re-
spect that understanding of the governing rule of law.”211  And, in
Hutto v. Davis,212 the Court stated even more emphatically that, “un-
less we wish anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system, a
precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts
no matter how misguided the judges of those courts may think it to
be.”213
The Court most recently summed up this position in Sanchez-
Llamas v. Oregon,214 where it declined to give decisive weight to an
international tribunal’s construction of a treaty.215  The Court de-
clared that, “[i]f treaties are to be given effect as federal law under our
legal system, determining their meaning as a matter of federal law ‘is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department,’ headed
by the ‘one supreme Court’ established by the Constitution.”216
III
ENSURING THE SUPREME COURT’S ROLE IN THE
JUDICIAL HIERARCHY
Though the matter is not free from doubt, I conclude that the
Constitution creates a hierarchical judiciary and renders the Court
“supreme” in defining the content of federal law.  Although many
scholars appear to have accepted this hierarchical vision, they have
not realized all of its implications.  A number of scholars have argued
that the Court’s constitutional “supremacy” places limits on Con-
gress’s power to regulate Supreme Court jurisdiction.217  Scholars
211 Id. at 312; see id. (“[The lower court decisions] were not wrong according to some
abstract standard of interpretive validity, but by the rules that necessarily govern our hierar-
chical federal court system.”).
212 454 U.S. 370 (1982).
213 Id. at 375; see id. at 374–75 (admonishing the court of appeals for “having ignored,
consciously or unconsciously, the hierarchy of the federal court system created by the Con-
stitution and Congress”).
214 548 U.S. 331 (2006).
215 See id. at 353–55.
216 Id. at 353–54 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803))
(emphasis added).
217 See Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 165, at 1023, 1030 (asserting that “any exercise
of authority by” inferior federal courts, and any construction of federal law by state courts,
must be subject to Supreme Court review); Caminker, supra note 36, at 835–37 (contend-
ing that the Court must have “jurisdiction sufficiently broad to provide general leadership
in defining federal law”); Claus, supra note 165, at 64 (urging that “Congress can never . . .
remove from the Supreme Court the ability to have ultimate judgment of Article III mat-
ters”); Pfander, supra note 165, at 1500–01 (asserting that it would raise “serious constitu-
tional questions” if Congress sought to eliminate both the Court’s appellate jurisdiction
and its authority to supervise lower federal courts by issuing discretionary writs, such as
mandamus); Pfander, supra note 167, at 236 (making a similar claim with respect to state
courts). But see Edward A. Hartnett, Not the King’s Bench, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 283, 314–15
(2003) (arguing that, “even if th[e] constitutional requirement of inferiority refers to” a
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have also focused on what the hierarchical structure means for the
lower courts, generally concluding that inferior federal and state
courts have a constitutional duty to abide by Supreme Court
precedents.218
Scholars have not, however, considered that the Supreme Court
may itself need to take action to preserve its “supreme” position in the
judicial hierarchy.  I explore that question here.  In our current judi-
cial system, the Court has few mechanisms at its disposal to communi-
cate its views on federal law to the “subordinate” federal and state
courts.  The Court lacks the power to directly reward or sanction
lower federal or state court judges.  Indeed, under our constitutional
structure, the Court’s appellate review authority appears to constitute
its only means of overseeing the lower courts.  And I argue that the
current Supreme Court cannot effectively supervise those judicial in-
feriors unless it uses that appellate review power to issue vertically
maximal decisions.
A. Direct Rewards and Sanctions
The Supreme Court’s lack of control over the lower federal and
state courts is striking when contrasted with the oversight mechanisms
available to the President, Congress, and high courts in many foreign
jurisdictions.  Each of those entities has some control over the selec-
tion, advancement, and/or dismissal of its subordinates.  The Su-
preme Court, by contrast, has no such tools available to ensure its
status in the judicial hierarchy.
The political branches of the federal government have various
mechanisms at their disposal to supervise and control subordinate of-
ficials.  Notably, I focus on each branch’s authority to supervise offi-
cials within its own branch because that offers the closest analogy to
the Supreme Court’s relationship with lower federal and state courts.
For example, Article II gives the President broad authority to nomi-
hierarchical relationship, Congress would still have considerable authority to regulate the
Court’s jurisdiction).
218 See Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 167, at 276 n.106 (contending that lower federal
courts and state courts have an “obligation to follow Supreme Court precedent”);
Caminker, supra note 36, at 834 (arguing that “Article III commands all inferior federal
courts to obey Supreme Court precedent”); Claus, supra note 165, at 71 (agreeing that the
Constitution “subordinates all other courts’ conclusions on Article III issues to those of the
one [Supreme] Court”); James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judi-
cial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 649 (2004) (asserting that lower federal
courts “must respect the decisions of their judicial superiors as controlling authority”);
Pfander, supra note 167, at 202 (arguing that state courts must “give effect to federal law as
pronounced by the Supreme Court”); Judge Stephen Reinhardt, The Supreme Court, the
Death Penalty, and the Harris Case, 102 YALE L.J. 205, 206 (1992) (asserting that lower federal
courts have a “constitutional obligation” “to apply whatever decisions the [Supreme] Court
issues”).
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nate and, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint the prin-
cipal officers in federal agencies.219  Article II further states that he
may “require” those principal officers to provide him with an “Opin-
ion, in writing, . . . upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their
respective Offices.”220  The President may also use his appointment
authority to promote subordinates to more prestigious or more lucra-
tive positions within the Executive Branch.  Finally, the President has
considerable authority to remove subordinate executive officials.221
These tools enable the President to ensure, to some degree, that
lower-ranking federal officials faithfully implement his preferred
policies.
Likewise, Congress, as a body, has some authority to exert control
over its members.  The House and Senate do not, of course, select
their members (who are popularly elected),222 but they can promote
their members to more influential positions within the chamber.  Arti-
cle I provides that the “House of Representatives shall chuse their
Speaker and other Officers”223 and further states that, although the
Vice President is by default the President of the Senate, “[t]he Senate
shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President pro tempore”
who presides over the chamber in the Vice President’s absence.224
Congress also has the authority to sanction and remove its members.
Under Article I, each “House may determine the Rules of its Proceed-
ings, punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and, with the Con-
currence of two thirds, expel a Member.”225
Superior courts in many foreign jurisdictions also have various
ways (other than appellate review) of exerting influence over judges
219 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976).
220 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
221 The President has almost unlimited authority to remove high-level officials in exec-
utive agencies. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176–77 (1926) (invalidating a stat-
ute that failed to give the President “the unrestricted power of removal” of certain
executive officers).  The President also has some authority to remove officials in indepen-
dent agencies. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691–93, 696–97 (1988) (upholding the
independent counsel statute, in part because it permitted the Executive Branch to remove
an independent counsel “for cause”); see also Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The Presi-
dent and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 110 (1994) (arguing that “for cause” re-
moval provisions may give the President “a large degree of removal . . . power”).  Some
scholars contend that the President should have unlimited authority to remove
subordinate executive officials. See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural
Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1166 (1992) (noting
the argument of some unitary executive theorists that “the President has total power to
remove [subordinate] officers who make [executive] policy decisions with which he
disagrees”).
222 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
223 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
224 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 5; see id. cl. 4 (“The Vice President . . . shall be President
of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.”).
225 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
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on subordinate courts.  The highest court in some jurisdictions con-
trols the appointment and/or advancement of lower court judges.226
For example, the Chief Justice of the Japanese Supreme Court heads
the Secretariat (the administrative wing of the judiciary), which deter-
mines whether to promote lower court judges to higher, and higher-
paying, judicial office.227
The Supreme Court of the United States can use none of these
oversight mechanisms.  The Constitution does not give the Court any
authority to select or promote lower federal court judges.  Instead,
they are appointed and elevated to higher office by the President, with
the advice and consent of the Senate.228  Nor can the Supreme Court
remove, or otherwise sanction, an inferior federal or state court judge
for disobeying its mandate or failing to abide by one of its precedents.
Inferior federal court judges enjoy the same life tenure and salary pro-
tections as Supreme Court Justices229 and may be removed only
through impeachment by the House and conviction by the Senate.230
State court judges, of course, are subject to (and thus protected by)
the appointment, promotion, and removal processes established by
their respective states.231  The constitutional structure thus seems to
foreclose many avenues of oversight that might otherwise enable the
Supreme Court to retain control over the content of federal law.
226 See Lydia Brashear Tiede, Judicial Independence: Often Cited, Rarely Understood, 15 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 129, 152 (2006)  (“In many countries, such as Chile, Supreme
Court justices rank all lower court justices based on their decisions and performance as
judges.  This ranking in turn affects lower court judges’ pay and promotion possibilities.”
(footnote omitted)); James M. West & Dae-Kyu Yoon, The Constitutional Court of the Republic
of Korea: Transforming the Jurisprudence of the Vortex?, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 73, 81 (1992) (noting
that the Korean Supreme Court “control[s] . . . promotions and transfers of judges at the
lower levels”); Bruce M. Wilson, Claiming Individual Rights Through a Constitutional Court:
The Example of Gays in Costa Rica, 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 242, 248 (2007) (observing that in
Costa Rica, Supreme Court magistrates “appoint all lower court judges”).
227 See J. MARK RAMSEYER & ERIC B. RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JUDGING IN JAPAN 10–12 (2003).
228 The Constitution does not expressly state that inferior federal court judges are
“principal” officers who must be appointed in this manner.  But that has been our practice
to date.  In any event, the important point (for my purposes) is that the Constitution
clearly does not require that those judges be selected by the Supreme Court.
229 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in
Office.”).
230 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (“The House of Representatives . . . shall have the
sole Power of Impeachment.”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (“The Senate shall have the sole
Power to try all Impeachments.”).
231 For the most current information on the selection and removal procedures in the
various states, see American Judicature Society: Judicial Selection in the states, http://
www.judicialselection.us (last visited Oct. 3, 2009).
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B. Appellate Review
The constitutional structure appears to offer the Court only one
mechanism to preserve its “supreme” role in the judicial hierarchy:
appellate review.  The Court can ensure its supremacy over the con-
tent of federal law by examining the legal determinations of
subordinate courts.  Congress may, of course, make “exceptions” to
the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.  But I am interested in how the
Court can use its appellate review authority to preserve its hierarchical
status in those areas over which it has jurisdiction (as it currently has
over most federal law).
To ensure its supremacy over federal law, the Court can exercise
its appellate review power in essentially two ways.  First, it can employ
what I refer to as “error correction”: reversing specific lower federal
and state court decisions with which it disagrees (with or without pro-
viding instructions on how the law should apply to the facts of those
cases).232  Second, the Court can employ what I refer to as “precedent
setting”: articulating legal rules in written opinions that will serve as
precedents for lower courts in that case and future cases.  The Su-
preme Court may of course (and indeed often does) perform both
functions in the same case.  But, for purposes of this analysis, it is use-
ful to distinguish between these two basic forms of appellate review
because they roughly correspond to the two approaches to opinion
writing examined here: minimalism and vertical maximalism.  When
the Court issues a minimalist opinion, carefully tailored to the facts of
a given dispute, it engages in a kind of error correction.  Indeed, a
minimalist opinion is designed to resolve only “the case at hand”233
and thus to have little precedential impact in future cases.  By con-
trast, when the Court issues a more vertically maximal opinion, it nec-
essarily establishes a precedent for lower courts to apply in future
cases.
I do not claim that the constitutional structure, in the abstract,
favors either error correction or precedent setting as a mode of appel-
late review.  I thus also do not claim that the Constitution inherently
prefers either minimalism or vertical maximalism.  In theory, either
approach could be consistent with the Court’s “supreme” role in the
judicial hierarchy.  Instead, I assert that the Court should use the
mode of appellate review that will best preserve its hierarchical posi-
tion, given the practical constraints on the judiciary in a given histori-
cal period.  Thus, I argue that, at the Founding, error correction may
232 The Court does not, of course, need to explain how the law should apply even in
the particular case.  If, on remand, the lower court erred again, the Court could (in the-
ory) simply reverse again.  The Court might, however, be inclined to simplify the process
by explaining how the lower court erred in the particular case.
233 SUNSTEIN, supra note 14, at 10.
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\95-1\CRN104.txt unknown Seq: 45  3-NOV-09 10:57
2009] THE STRUCTURAL CASE FOR VERTICAL MAXIMALISM 45
have been the Court’s only effective means of performing its “su-
preme” constitutional role.  By contrast, in our current judiciary, the
Court can effectively preserve its role in the judicial hierarchy only by
employing vertical maximalism.
1. Error Correction in the Early Court
In the earliest years of the republic, the Supreme Court had few
ways of communicating its views on federal law to the lower federal
and state courts.  Although the Court held its first session in February
1790,234 the first comprehensive Supreme Court reporters were not
published until 1804.235  Thus, during its first decade, the Court could
not maintain its supreme status by issuing precedential decisions via
written opinion.236  Instead, the Court could ensure its role in the ju-
dicial hierarchy only by correcting errors in the individual lower court
decisions that came before it on appeal.  Nor did the Court make an
effort to issue precedential decisions in its first decade.  Instead, the
Justices often wrote seriatim, issuing separate opinions reflecting their
individual views on the legal issue before the Court.237
234 See Appointment of Justices, 2 U.S. 399 (1790).  It took a few years, however, for any
appeals to reach the Court. See 6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES: 1789–1800, at 3 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1998) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY] (noting that “there was a lag before the Supreme Court’s docket began to fill
up,” in part because federal cases had to first cycle through the lower federal courts, and in
part because litigants in the early 1790s only twice sought review of state court decisions).
The Court thus spent its first few terms dealing with internal business and did not hear
cases until August 1791. See id. at 1.  The Court issued its first written decision in 1792. See
ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 55 n.116 (8th ed. 2002) (“On August 11,
1792, the Supreme Court rendered its first written decision: Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) 402 (1792).”).
235 See RITZ, supra note 200, at 46–47; 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY 288 (1922) (noting that, “after the close of [the] 1804 Term . . .
William Cranch, the Chief Justice of the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, issued
the first volume of his [Supreme Court] Reports”).  Alexander Dallas, a prominent lawyer
who published state court reports in Pennsylvania, see RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN
CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 118, 158 (1971), began to publish
Supreme Court opinions in 1798, see 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 234, at 648 n.2
(observing that Dallas’s second volume was published in 1798); J.M. SOSIN, THE ARISTOC-
RACY OF THE LONG ROBE: THE ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AMERICA 284–85 (1989) (not-
ing that the second volume was the first to contain Supreme Court opinions).  But his
reports were apparently incomplete. See 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1789–1800, at xlii, xliv (Maeva Marcus & James R. Perry eds.,
1985) (stating that The Documentary History constitutes “the first accurate record of all cases
heard by the Supreme Court between 1790 and 1800,” including “cases . . . not reported by
Alexander James Dallas”).
236 See SOSIN, supra note 235, at 203–04, 284–85 (noting the limited availability of law
reports in the early republic).
237 See DONALD G. MORGAN, JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON: THE FIRST DISSENTER 45–46
(1954) (“[N]early one-fifth of the adjudications [before 1801] found all the justices expres-
sing their individual convictions . . . .”).
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Two developments in the nineteenth century were necessary
before the Court could supervise lower federal and state courts by is-
suing precedential opinions: First, the Court had to begin writing
joint opinions.  Second, those written opinions had to be accessible to
lawyers and lower federal and state court judges.  The first change
came in 1801, when newly appointed Chief Justice John Marshall con-
vinced the other Justices to begin issuing joint Opinions of the
Court.238  But the second development (the availability of Supreme
Court decisions) was more gradual.  Although the first Supreme Court
reporters were published in 1804, they were not widely circulated, at
least not to all regions of the country.239  Lawyers and lower court
judges in those regions could still obtain information about certain
important Supreme Court precedents, such as Marbury v. Madison,240
because such decisions were reported in newspapers and other peri-
odicals during that period.241  Less salient precedents, however, were
less likely to reach lower courts.  Indeed, it does not appear that Su-
preme Court decisions were widely circulated until at least the
1830s.242  Accordingly, during its early years, the Supreme Court had
to rely at least in part on error correction to ensure its status in the
judicial hierarchy.
Moreover, even after precedent setting became one way of super-
vising the lower federal and state courts, error correction still likely
served as an effective oversight mechanism.  The early Court had
mandatory (and limited) appellate jurisdiction243 and had the capac-
ity to decide every case that came before it on appeal.  In its entire
238 See SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 123 (1990)
(“[U]nder Marshall’s leadership . . . the Court abandoned the practice of seriatim opinion
writing and united behind a single opinion.”).
239 See 1 WARREN, supra note 235, at 455–56.  Indeed, Daniel Webster commented in
1818 that “[t]he sale [of Supreme Court reports] is not very rapid.  The number of law
libraries which contain a complete set is comparatively small.” Id. at 456 n.1.
240 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
241 See 1 WARREN, supra note 235, at 288 (observing that a summary of Marbury was
“widely published and commented upon in the newspapers”); see also SOSIN, supra note
235, at 204 (noting that, at the Founding, “judicial precedents existed” mostly in “pam-
phlets and newspaper accounts and the recollections of lawyers and judges”).
242 See 1 WARREN, supra note 235, at 455 (“Many years elapsed before the Supreme
Court Reports obtained any wide sale or circulation among lawyers.  Even as late as 1830,
[Supreme Court Reporter] Richard Peters[ ] stated that ‘few copies were found in many
large districts of the country.’”).  Moreover, in its first few decades, the Court did not play a
direct role in the publication of its decisions.  Instead, Supreme Court reports were “pri-
vate ventures.” SOSIN, supra note 235, at 204.  The Court did not appoint its own official
reporter until 1817. See id.
243 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 22, 25, 1 Stat. 73, 84–87 (authorizing review
over state court decisions that denied a federal right and over federal circuit court deci-
sions in civil matters when the amount in controversy exceeded $2000); Engdahl, supra
note 166, at 497 (noting that “$2,000 was a great deal of money in those days”); Eugene
Gressman, Requiem for the Supreme Court’s Obligatory Jurisdiction, 65 A.B.A. J. 1325, 1327
(1979) (observing that appellate review was mandatory from 1789 to 1891).
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first decade, the Court heard fewer than 100 cases,244 and its docket
remained quite manageable through the first few decades of the nine-
teenth century.245  Indeed, for this reason, the Court held only two
sessions each year;246 the Justices spent the bulk of their time riding
circuit.247  It seems likely that, in this environment, the Court could
effectively supervise the inferior federal and state courts by (at least in
part) correcting errors in specific lower court decisions.
2. Capacity Constraints and the 1925 Judiciary Act
The Supreme Court’s caseload began to increase dramatically in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.248  This develop-
ment was largely due to a rise in federal legislation (as the govern-
ment stepped in to regulate more sectors of the economy),249 but also
resulted from Congress’s expansion of the Court’s jurisdiction.250  By
the 1920s, the Court was unable to keep up with its caseload.  As a
result, Chief Justice William Howard Taft sought legislation to ease
the burden on the Court and to give it more discretion to choose the
244 See STERN ET AL., supra note 234, at 55.
245 See DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS
156 (8th ed. 2008) (providing a chart showing that the Court’s docket from 1800 until
1850 generally included 250 cases or fewer).
246 See David M. O’Brien, Managing the Business of the Supreme Court, 45 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 667, 671 (1985) (stating that the Court’s February and August terms lasted no more
than two or three weeks).  The Court later switched to a short annual term. See id.
247 The Justices rode circuit from 1789 until 1911.  Steven G. Calabresi & David C.
Presser, Reintroducing Circuit Riding: A Timely Proposal, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1386, 1390 (2006).
248 See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS & DE-
VELOPMENTS 63 tbl.2-2 (4th ed. 2007) (showing the rise in the Court’s caseload from 1116
in 1910 to 1316 in 1924); FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE
SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 60 (Transaction Publishers
2007) (1928) (noting that, in 1850, the Supreme Court’s docket included 253 cases while,
by 1890, its docket had swelled to 1816).
249 See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 248, at 57–60, 206–08, 230 (observing that
the increased workload during this period was partly due to “the extension of the field of
federal activity”).
250 See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 127, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (conferring general federal
question jurisdiction in any case in which the amount in controversy exceeded $500); Act
of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790, 790 (extending the Court’s appellate jurisdiction to
include all federal question cases from state courts, not only those denying a federal right);
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 248, at 65, 198 (noting that these statutes contributed to
the rise in the Court’s caseload).  Congress provided some relief in 1891, when it created
the federal courts of appeals and gave the Court discretionary certiorari review over certain
appeals from those courts. See Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 6, 26 Stat.
826, 828 (authorizing discretionary review over cases involving diversity, revenue laws, pat-
ent laws, federal criminal laws, and admiralty).  This legislation led to a temporary decline
in the Court’s workload. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 248, at 62 tbl.2-2 (showing a decline
from 1816 in 1890 to 723 in 1900); FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 248, at 101–02.  But
its workload rose again at the turn of the century. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 248, at
62–63 tbl.2-2 (showing an increase from 723 in 1900 to 1316 in 1924).
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cases that it would hear.251  Congress responded with the Judiciary Act
of 1925, which reduced the Court’s mandatory appellate docket and
substantially replaced it with discretionary review via writs of
certiorari.252
The Justices and legislators understood that this conferral of dis-
cretionary review power was a necessary result of the Court’s capacity
constraints.253  As Chief Justice Taft stated, “[w]hen one court could
attend to all appellate business, as was the case early in the history of
our court . . . [t]here was no objection . . . to making . . . appeal [to
the Supreme Court] a matter of right.”254  But, he emphasized,
“[w]hen . . . the business has accumulated so that one court can not
take care of all the appellate business, intermediate courts are intro-
duced, and the office of the Supreme Court has ceased to be that of a
tribunal to afford everybody a review of his case.”255
Instead, the Justices and legislators agreed, the Supreme Court
should concentrate its limited resources on “important” cases.256  And
what is striking is the way that these participants defined “important.”
A case was “significant” or “important” enough for resolution by the
Supreme Court if it had implications beyond the narrow circum-
stances of that dispute.  The case had to present broad legal questions
that would impact not only the litigants before the Court but also the
251 For an in-depth discussion of the Chief Justice’s efforts, see Edward A. Hartnett,
Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 1643, 1660–1704 (2000).
252 See Judiciary Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-415, 43 Stat. 936.  The Act did, however,
leave in place mandatory jurisdiction over (1) state court decisions invalidating federal
statutes or treaties; (2) state court decisions upholding state law against federal constitu-
tional challenge; (3) certain decisions by three-judge district courts; (4) certain criminal
appeals by the United States; and (5) federal appellate court decisions invalidating state
laws. See § 1, 43 Stat. at 937–39.
253 See Procedure in Federal Courts: Hearing on S. 2060 and S. 2061 Before the Subcomm. of the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 47 (1924) [hereinafter Procedure Hearing] (statement
of J. James C. McReynolds) (“[T]he number of possible Federal questions has become so
large that we simply cannot pass upon all of them.”); H.R. REP. NO. 68-1075, at 2 (1925)
(“The bill is designed to lessen the number of cases which under existing law reach the
Supreme Court.”); STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 68th Cong., REPORT ON THE JUDI-
CIAL CODE 2 (Comm. Print 1925) (“The primary object of the bill is to relieve the conges-
tion resulting from the present overcrowded docket of the Supreme Court . . . .”).
254 William Howard Taft, Address to the New York County Bar Association 6 (Feb. 18,
1922), microformed on William H. Taft Papers, Reel 590 (Library of Congress) [hereinafter
Taft Papers] (discussing the proposed legislation).
255 Id.
256 See H.R. REP. NO. 68-1075, at 2 (stating that the bill would eliminate “cases of trivial
character” and give the Court time to “determin[e] more important cases”); STAFF OF S.
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 68th Cong., REPORT ON JUDICIAL CODE, at 2 (“[The bill] puts
within the ability of the court the means of confining its jurisdiction to important
cases . . . .”); see also FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 248, at 260 (“At the heart of the
[1925 legislation] was the conservation of the Supreme Court as the arbiter of legal issues
of national significance.”).
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general public.257  Thus, as Justice Willis Van Devanter explained dur-
ing congressional hearings on the measure, one of the central consid-
erations in granting a petition for certiorari was “whether the
questions presented in the case are of wide or public importance or
concern only the parties to the particular case.”258  Likewise, Justice
James McReynolds stated that the lower federal and state courts
should be the principal fora for dispute resolution.259  “But if the
cause involves [a] matter of general importance, some statute to be
construed, some constitutional provision, it should come to us for fi-
nal disposition.”260  He declared that “the chief purpose of the Su-
preme Court should be to decide questions of law so that lawyers will
know how to advise their clients and trial courts can dispose of their
cases.”261
Chief Justice Taft also emphasized the unique role of the Su-
preme Court.  He described the Court as “the head of the Federal
Judiciary, and, in a constitutional sense, the head of the Judiciary of
the Nation.”262  When a case goes beyond the lower courts to that
high court, “it is not primarily to preserve the rights of the litigants.
The Supreme Court’s function is for the purpose of expounding and
stabilizing principles of law . . . for the public benefit.”263  The Court
should accordingly hear a case only when “the principle involved is
such that it is important to have a general exposition of it for the
257 See H.R. REP. NO. 68-1075, at 2 (“The problem is whether the time and attention
and energy of the [Supreme] court shall be devoted to matters of large public concern, or
whether they shall be consumed by matters of less concern, without especial general inter-
est, and only because the litigant wants to have the court of last resort pass upon his
right.”); S. REP. NO. 68-362, at 3 (1924) (“The central thought [behind the legislation] is
this, that . . . ordinary litigation should end [in the lower courts] and that the cases should
not go to the Supreme Court . . . unless the questions involved are of grave public concern
or unless serious uncertainty attends the decision of the . . . circuit court of appeals by
reason of conflict in the rulings of these courts or the courts of the States.”); see also Second
Annual Message of President Calvin Coolidge (Dec. 3, 1924), in 3 THE STATE OF THE UNION
MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1790–1966, at 2655, 2662 (Fred L. Israel ed., 1966) (support-
ing the legislation because it would empower the Court to “dispos[e] of those [cases]
which are not of public moment”); infra notes 258–65 and accompanying text.
258 Procedure Hearing, supra note 253, at 29–30 (statement of J. Willis Van Devanter).
Justice Van Devanter was reportedly the principal draftsman of the 1925 Judiciary Act. See
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 248, at 260.
259 See Procedure Hearing, supra note 253, at 45 (statement of J. McReynolds).
260 Id.
261 Id. at 47.
262 Letter from William Howard Taft to Senator Reed Smoot 2 (July 3, 1925), Taft
Papers, supra note 254, at Reel 275.
263 Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts of Appeals and United States Supreme Court: Hearing on H.R.
10479 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 2 (1922) [hereinafter Jurisdiction Hear-
ing] (statement of C.J. Taft).
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benefit of the lawyers, for the benefit of the inferior courts, and for
the benefit of the public at large.”264  He stated:
The real work which the Supreme Court has to do is for the public
at large, as distinguished from the particular litigants before it.  Its
main purpose [is] to lay down . . . important principles of law . . .
and thus to help the people at large to a knowledge of their rights
and duties, and to make the law clearer.265
The 1925 Judiciary Act thus marked a turning point in the institu-
tional role of the Supreme Court.  The Court could no longer serve as
a court of error but instead had to rely increasingly on precedent set-
ting to oversee its judicial inferiors.266  Indeed, Chief Justice Taft
stated that, in considering applications for certiorari, “whether the
case was rightly decided in the court below” would now be a “[ques-
tion] of minor consideration.”267
3. Expansion of Discretionary Review in the 1988 Judiciary Act
The 1925 Judiciary Act provided temporary relief but did not
solve the Court’s workload problems.  In the latter half of the twenti-
eth century, the Court’s docket grew further,268 in part because of the
expanding federal administrative state269 and also because of changes
in the Court’s own doctrine, which recognized a string of new consti-
264 Id. at 3; see also William Howard Taft, The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court Under the
Act of February 13, 1925, 35 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1925) [hereinafter Taft, Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court] (stating that the Supreme Court should hear cases involving “principles, the applica-
tion of which are of wide public or governmental interest, and which should be authorita-
tively declared by the final court”).
265 Taft, supra note 254, at 6–7.
266 Notably, the Court’s certiorari rules have, since 1925, reflected this increasing em-
phasis on law declaration over dispute resolution. See Taft, Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
supra note 264, at 3 n.4 (quoting the Court’s certiorari rules, which, beginning in 1925,
provided that certiorari would be “granted only where there are special and important
reasons,” including when “a state court has decided a federal question of substance not
theretofore determined by this court, or has decided it in a way probably not in accord
with applicable decisions of this court,” or in the event of a conflict among the lower
courts); SUP. CT. R. 10 (Considerations Governing Review on Certiorari).  There have been
only two notable changes in the Court’s certiorari rules since 1925.  First, following Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the Court stopped reviewing “important ques-
tion[s] of local law.” Cf. Taft, Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, supra note 264, at 3 n.4 (not-
ing that the Court previously considered such matters).  Second, the Court has further
underscored that it will resolve a conflict in the lower courts only if the matter involves an
“important” federal question. See STERN ET AL., supra note 234, at 225 (noting that the
Court amended its rules in 1995 to make this requirement explicit).
267 Jurisdiction Hearing, supra note 263, at 3 (statement of C.J. Taft).
268 See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 248, at 65–67 tbl.2-2 (showing that the Supreme
Court’s caseload rose from 1321 in 1950, to 4761 in 1975, and to 8965 in 2000).
269 See O’Brien, supra note 246, at 667 (“[B]y and large, the docket reflects the course
of legislation and broad socioeconomic change in the country.”).
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\95-1\CRN104.txt unknown Seq: 51  3-NOV-09 10:57
2009] THE STRUCTURAL CASE FOR VERTICAL MAXIMALISM 51
tutional rights (particularly in the area of criminal procedure).270
The Court also faced increasing challenges in overseeing the lower
courts because of a sharp increase in their workload.  For example,
between 1960 and 1983, the number of filings in federal district courts
rose from approximately 80,000 to 280,000 cases per year, and those
in the courts of appeals grew in similar proportion (from approxi-
mately 3800 to nearly 30,000 cases per year).271  These figures, of
course, do not even include all filings in bankruptcy court, nor do
they encompass the many state cases raising issues of federal law.272
Accordingly, beginning in the 1970s, the Supreme Court—this
time led by Chief Justice Warren Burger—once again called upon
Congress to address the Court’s caseload.273  In 1988, Congress re-
sponded by largely eliminating the Court’s remaining mandatory ap-
pellate jurisdiction so that the Court could hear virtually every appeal
by way of discretionary certiorari review.274
The 1988 Judiciary Act reflected the same vision of the Supreme
Court’s role as the 1925 statute.  The modern Court did not have the
capacity to serve as a court of error, focusing on mistakes in specific
lower court rulings.  Instead, the Court should concentrate its limited
resources on developing legal principles with a broader impact.275
270 See id. at 667, 669 (suggesting that “[d]ecisions expanding the constitutional rights
of indigents . . . contributed to an increase in filings” in the post–World War II period).
271 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 61 tbl.3.1, 64
tbl.3.2 (1985) (reporting that, from 1960 to 1983, filings in district court rose from 79,200
to 277,031 and those in appellate courts rose from 3765 to 29,580).
272 There do not appear to be statistics on precisely how many federal claims are heard
in state court. See Pfander, supra note 167, at 233 n.184.
273 There were various suggestions for how the Court could best address its capacity
constraints.  Much of the debate focused on the possible creation of a national court of
appeals to assist the Court, particularly in resolving lower court conflicts. See Report of the
Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court, 57 F.R.D. 573, 590–95 (1972) (recom-
mending a National Court of Appeals to take on part of the Court’s workload); Commis-
sion on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, Structure and Internal
Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 199 (1975) (recommending a
National Court of Appeals to hear cases referred by the Supreme Court or transferred
from a federal court of appeals).  This proposal was, however, criticized by some Justices
and scholars, and “ultimately the idea withered away.”  Margaret Meriwether Cordray &
Richard Cordray, The Supreme Court’s Plenary Docket, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737, 741–42
(2001).
274 See Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662 (1988).
275 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 100-660, at 14 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 766, 779
(stating that “[t]he Supreme Court—which of course sits at the apex of the Federal judicial
system—can devote plenary consideration only to about 150 cases a year” and should thus
concentrate its limited resources on “cases involving principles the application of which
are of wide public importance or governmental interest”); S. REP. NO. 100-300, at 4 (1988)
(“History has shown that imposing . . . mandatory functions on the Supreme Court tends
to weaken the Court’s capacity both to control its own docket and to confine its labors to
those cases of national importance.”).
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Indeed, as the Court emphasized in successive letters to Congress
(endorsing the 1988 reforms),276 this “law enunciation” vision of its
institutional role was the motivating force behind the 1925 Judiciary
Act.  The premise of that legislation was that the Court should not
spend “its limited time and resources on cases which do not, in Chief
Justice Taft’s words, ‘involve principles . . . of wide public importance
or governmental interest.’”277  The Court stated that its case-manage-
ment concerns had only grown more acute since the 1920s: “Because
the volume of complex and difficult cases continues to grow, it is even
more important that the Court not be burdened by . . . cases that are
of significance only to the individual litigants but of no ‘wide public
importance.’”278
Notably, the Court also emphasized the impact of its capacity con-
straints on the lower federal and state courts.  The Court explained
that it was “impossible . . . to give plenary consideration [to] all the
mandatory appeals it receive[d],” and it therefore had to “dispose of
many cases summarily, often without written opinion.”279  This ap-
proach, however, was a “generally unsatisfactory” solution to its work-
load concerns because of the effect of such decisions on the lower
courts.280  Such rulings were “decisions on the merits” and thus were
“binding on state courts and other federal courts.”281  But such terse
rulings “often . . . provide[d] uncertain guidelines for the courts that
276 See S. REP. NO. 100-300, at 2 (noting “‘the unanimous view of the Supreme Court
endorsing elimination of the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction’” (quoting Letter from C.J.
William Rehnquist to Sen. Heflin (Nov. 17, 1987))); H.R. REP. NO. 100-660, at 27, 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 781 (Letter from Supreme Court to Rep. Kastenmeier (June 17, 1982));
Letter from Supreme Court to Sen. DeConcini (June 22, 1978), reprinted in Gressman,
supra note 243, at 1328.
277 H.R. REP. NO. 100-660, at 27, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 781–82 (Letter from Supreme
Court to Rep. Kastenmeier); see Letter from Supreme Court to Sen. DeConcini (June 22,
1978), reprinted in Gressman, supra note 243, at 1328.
278 H.R. REP. NO. 100-660, at 27, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 781–82 (Letter from Supreme
Court to Rep. Kastenmeier).
279 Id. at 28, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N at 782.  Indeed, the Court often appeared to use its
certiorari standards in adjudicating mandatory appeals, when it dismissed state appeals for
want of a substantial federal question or summarily affirmed lower federal court decisions.
See H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT 104–06 (1991); see also H.R. REP. NO. 98-986, at 9–10 (1984) (listing, as one reason
for “eliminating” much of the Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction, the fact that “the
Supreme Court has necessarily come to treat cases that require review as the functional
equivalent of . . . cases that are reviewed on a discretionary basis”).
280 Letter from Supreme Court to Sen. DeConcini (June 22, 1978), reprinted in Gress-
man, supra note 243, at 1328.
281 H.R. REP. NO. 100-660, at 28, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 782 (Letter from Supreme
Court to Rep. Kastenmeier); see Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344–45 (1975).  But such
decisions had an uncertain precedential status, see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671
(1974) (stating that summary affirmances “are not of the same precedential value” as an
opinion on the merits), and did not necessarily apply at all in different factual circum-
stances,  see Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 177 (1977).  By contrast, the denial of certio-
rari is clearly not a decision on the merits. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 296 (1989).
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[were] bound to follow them and, not surprisingly, . . . sometimes
create[d] more confusion than they [sought] to resolve.”282
4. The Trend Toward Precedent Setting in the Modern Court
The 1925 and 1988 Judiciary Acts signaled a change in the Su-
preme Court’s institutional role and, specifically, in its hierarchical
relationship with the lower federal and state courts.  The Court could
no longer rely on its authority to correct errors in specific lower court
decisions.  Instead, to maintain its “supreme” status in the judicial hi-
erarchy, the Court increasingly had to establish written precedents for
lower courts to apply in the many cases that it lacked the capacity to
review.  And, as several scholars have observed, that is precisely what
the Court began to do in the wake of the 1925 Act.  “From Taft on-
ward, the justices . . . emphasized that the function of the Supreme
Court is not to correct errors in the lower courts, but to ‘secur[e]
harmony of decision and the appropriate settlement of questions of
general importance.’”283
This transformation in the Court’s institutional role also led to
changes in its written opinions.  When the Court’s job was simply to
correct errors in specific lower court rulings, it could issue narrow de-
cisions that were tailored to the circumstances of the particular dis-
pute.  By contrast, as the Court focused increasingly on law
declaration, its opinions grew in length and in breadth.  There was, in
short, a gradual transition in the Court’s opinion writing away from
minimalism and toward a more vertically maximal approach.
Robert Post has recounted this transformation in a detailed his-
torical analysis of the Court’s opinion-writing practices from the 1920s
to the 1990s.284  Professor Post explains that the 1925 Judiciary Act
282 H.R. REP. NO. 100-660, at 28, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 782 (Letter from Supreme
Court to Rep. Kastenmeier).
283 Arthur D. Hellman, Caseload, Conflicts, and Decisional Capacity: Does the Supreme Court
Need Help?, 67 JUDICATURE 28, 30–31 (1983) (quoting Address of C.J. Hughes at the Ameri-
can Law Institute Meeting, in 20 A.B.A. J. 341, 341 (1934)); see Peter L. Strauss, One Hun-
dred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial
Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1096 (1987) (stating that “the enormous-
ness of the Court’s potential docket prohibits it from serving [as] . . . a court of errors”); see
also SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOHN SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT’S ROLE: A THE-
ORY OF MANAGING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL PROCESS 95 (1986) (arguing that the Court “should
not intervene simply to undo error below” (emphasis added)).
284 See Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Schol-
arship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1287 (2001) (observing
that, in the 1920s, “a full Supreme Court opinion was a routine method of deciding a large
proportion of the Court’s [mandatory] appellate docket,” and was “relatively short and
succinct,” but “[b]y the 1990s,” a full opinion “had become the Court’s way of addressing
the very few cases on its docket of exceptional importance.  Each opinion accordingly re-
ceived fuller and more extensive attention, manifested both by its relative length and by
the full complement of concurring and dissenting opinions that was likely to accompany
it”).
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marked the beginning of a significant evolution in the Court’s written
opinions.  “By empowering the Court to choose its own jurisdiction,
the Act shifted the Court’s emphasis away from opinions addressed to
private litigants, and toward opinions” more focused on “the develop-
ment of American law.”285
Indeed, as we have seen, that shift (from dispute resolution to law
declaration) was a central premise of the 1925 statute.  Chief Justice
Taft and others emphasized that “[t]he real work . . . the Supreme
Court has to do is for the public at large, as distinguished from the
particular litigants before it.”286  The Supreme Court should thus hear
a case only when “the principle involved is such that it is important to
have a general exposition of it for the benefit of the lawyers, for the
benefit of the inferior courts, and for the benefit of the public at
large.”287  Chief Justice Taft appeared to recognize that this new role
would entail changes in the Court’s written opinions.  He asserted
that the “chief function” of a Supreme Court opinion was not to re-
solve a specific dispute but to “clarify the law” in a way that would “be
helpful in other cases.”288  He thus declared:
The chief duty in a court of last resort is not to dispose of the case
but it is sufficiently to elaborate the principles, the importance of
which justify the bringing of the case here at all, to make the discus-
sion of those principles and the conclusion reached useful to the
country and to the Bar in clarifying doubtful questions of constitu-
tional and fundamental law.289
Notably, to serve this new function, the Court’s opinions could
not be tailored to the facts of a specific dispute.  Instead, as Professor
Post explains, “[c]rafting an opinion in order to influence the admin-
istration and development of the law . . . requires reaching out beyond
particular parties and addressing the entire community of legal
actors.”290
Peter Strauss has likewise noted that the modern Court has over
time altered its “manner of speaking” to “emphasize[ ] the enuncia-
tion of doctrine over the resolution of disputes.”291  Professor Strauss
observes that this development was a direct result of the Court’s capac-
ity constraints.  “That is, faced with a controversy over a subject it is
285 Id. at 1306.
286 Taft, supra note 254.
287 Jurisdiction Hearing, supra note 263, at 3 (statement of C.J. Taft).
288 Letter from William Howard Taft to Clyde B. Aitchison (Dec. 4, 1925), Taft Papers,
supra note 254, at Reel 278 (“[The Court’s] chief function [in writing opinions] is not to
get rid of cases, it is to clarify the law and to be helpful in other cases.  It is not a discharge of
that function to be cryptical and leave the reader still guessing.” (emphasis added)).
289 Letter from William Howard Taft to Charles P. Taft 3 (Nov. 1, 1925), Taft Papers,
supra note 254, at Reel 277.
290 Post, supra note 284, at 1308 (emphasis added).
291 See Strauss, supra note 283, at 1094–95.
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likely to see but once or twice a decade, the Court will tend to write an
essay on that subject—hoping to put that part of the law’s house in
order—rather than simply decide the case in the most direct manner
possible.”292
Professor Strauss has further recognized that, precisely because of
these capacity constraints, broad precedent setting may be the only
way that the Supreme Court can oversee lower courts in the judicial
hierarchy.293  He offers this theory as perhaps the best way of explain-
ing the Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc.294 Chevron, of course, directs all lower courts to
defer to an agency’s reasonable construction of an ambiguous federal
statute.295  The decision, which cuts across all substantive areas of ad-
ministrative law, constitutes a broad operative doctrine of deference
to the Executive Branch.  But Professor Strauss has urged that Chevron
should not be viewed simply “as a rule about agency discretion.”296
Chevron can also “be seen as a device for managing the courts of ap-
peals that can reduce (although not eliminate) the Supreme Court’s
need to police their decisions for accuracy.”297 Chevron thus serves as
a prime example of vertical maximalism—a broad decision that gov-
erns a number of future cases in the lower courts and thereby serves
to concentrate decision-making authority in the Supreme Court.
David Strauss (although not focused on judicial hierarchy) has, in
an influential article, identified several examples of equally broad de-
cisions in modern constitutional law.  His insights further suggest that
the modern Court has increasingly relied on precedent setting to per-
form its role in the judicial hierarchy.  David Strauss’s piece responds
to claims that Miranda v. Arizona298 was an “illegitimate” decision be-
cause it created a broad prophylactic rule to protect the Fifth Amend-
ment right against self-incrimination.299  He persuasively argues that
such prophylactic rules are “ubiquit[ous]” in modern constitutional
law.300  As examples, he identifies the broad presumption against
content-based restrictions on free speech (which are subject to strict
292 Id. at 1095.
293 See id. (“[T]he Court’s opinions on the merits may be influenced by its manage-
ment dilemmas.  It may choose outcomes that tend to make its control over the appellate
courts more effective . . . .”).
294 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
295 See id. at 842–44.
296 Strauss, supra note 283, at 1121.
297 Id.
298 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
299 See Strauss, supra note 10, at 190 (internal quotation marks omitted).
300 Id. (“[C]onstitutional law consists, to a significant degree, in the elaboration of
doctrines that are universally accepted as legitimate, but that have the same ‘prophylactic’
character as the Miranda rule.”).
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scrutiny),301 as well as the presumed validity of economic regulations
(which are subject to only rational basis scrutiny).302  Such operative
doctrines govern a large number of cases in the lower courts and thus,
much like Chevron, can “be seen as . . . device[s] for managing the
[inferior courts] that can reduce . . . the Supreme Court’s need to
police their decisions for accuracy.”303
These changes in the Court’s approach to opinion writing sug-
gest that it has, at least to some degree, recognized the implications of
its capacity constraints in the modern judiciary.  In an era of increas-
ing docket pressures, the Court cannot effectively perform its “su-
preme” role in the judicial hierarchy by issuing narrow, fact-bound
(minimalist) decisions that correct errors in specific lower court rul-
ings.  Instead, as Professor Post suggests, “[c]rafting an opinion in or-
der to influence the administration and development of the law” in
the modern judiciary “requires reaching out beyond particular parties”
and issuing broad (maximal) precedents that “address[ ] the entire
community of legal actors.”304
5. The Need for Vertical Maximalism in the Current Supreme Court
The Supreme Court’s challenges in overseeing the lower courts
have only increased in the two decades since the 1988 Judiciary Act.
The workload of the inferior federal courts has continued to rise dur-
ing this period.  For example, while the federal appellate courts in the
mid-1980s heard approximately 30,000 appeals per year,305 they now
review around 60,000 cases each year.306  The number of requests for
301 See id. at 198–204; see, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“Con-
tent-based regulations are presumptively invalid.”).  Notably, this broad rule against con-
tent-based restrictions was a creation of the post-1925 Court. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content
Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 189 (1983).
302 See Strauss, supra note 10, at 205–07; see also, e.g., Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314,
331–32 (1981) (stating that “economic legislation . . . that does not employ suspect classifi-
cations or impinge on fundamental rights” is presumptively valid).
303 Strauss, supra note 283, at 1121.
304 Post, supra note 284, at 1308 (emphasis added); see also id. (“Fashioning an opinion
. . . to resolve a dispute between parties . . . is rooted in the conception of the Supreme
Court as a tribunal of last resort that predominated during the first 150 years of [its]
existence.”).
305 See POSNER, supra note 271, at 64 tbl.3.2.
306 See FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS: U.S. COURT OF APPEALS – JUDICIAL
CASELOAD PROFILE (2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsa2008.pl (re-
porting that, in 2006, 66,618 appeals were filed and 67,582 were terminated; in 2007,
58,410 appeals were filed and 62,846 were terminated; and, in 2008, 61,104 appeals were
filed and 59,096 were terminated).  For statistics on the federal district courts, see FEDERAL
COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS: U.S. DISTRICT COURT – JUDICIAL CASELOAD PROFILE
(2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsd2008.pl (stating that, in 2006,
335,868 cases were filed and 350,807 were terminated; in 2007, 335,655 cases were filed
and 317,277 were terminated; and, in 2008, 349,969 cases were filed and 317,056 were
terminated).
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Supreme Court review has likewise risen dramatically.  In the 1980s,
the Court had approximately 5,000 cases on its annual docket,307 and
it decided around 150 of those cases (3 percent).308  By contrast, the
Court’s docket today includes about 9,000 cases, and it decides fewer
than 90 cases (less than 1 percent).309  There have, of course, been
calls in recent years for the Court to issue more rulings on the mer-
its.310  But even if the Court decided 150 or 200 cases per year (as
some have suggested),311 it would dispose of only a fraction of its
9,000-case docket and could not possibly correct every error in lower
court interpretations of federal law.
In this judicial hierarchy, it would seem to be even more impera-
tive that the Court adhere to the institutional vision that inspired the
1925 and 1988 Judiciary Acts.  Both pieces of legislation were built
upon a conception of the Court as “the head of the Judiciary of the
Nation,”312 which should hear cases only when “the principle involved
is such that it is important to have a general exposition of it for the
benefit of the lawyers, for the benefit of the inferior courts, and for
the benefit of the public at large.”313  As Chief Justice Taft recognized,
in order to perform that function, the Court cannot simply issue nar-
row decisions that resolve specific disputes.  The Court must “clarify
the law” in a way that will “be helpful in other cases.”314  To fulfill its
“supreme” role in this judicial hierarchy, the Court must focus on es-
tablishing broad precedents, not on correcting isolated errors in
lower court decisions.
Chief Justice Roberts’s call for minimalism thus comes at a rather
surprising time in the Court’s institutional history.  The Chief Justice
307 See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 248, at 66 tbl.2-2 (showing a docket of 5,144 cases in
1980; 5,100 cases in 1983; 5,158 cases in 1985; and 5,746 cases in 1989).
308 See id. at 74 tbl.2-6 (showing that the Court granted review in 184 cases in 1980; 149
cases in 1983; 186 cases in 1985; and 122 cases in 1989).
309 See 2008 ANNUAL REPORT: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF UNITED STATES COURTS 84 tbl.A-1,
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2008/contents.cfm (reporting that, in 2007,
the Court had 9,602 cases on its docket and issued 74 decisions on the merits, 72 with a full
opinion, 2 per curiam; in 2006, the Court had 10,256 cases on its docket and issued 78
decisions on the merits, 74 with a full opinion, 4 per curiam; and, in 2005, the Court had
9,608 cases on its docket and issued 87 decisions on the merits, 82 with a full opinion, 5 per
curiam).
310 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of
William Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1383 (2006) (asserting that “the [Supreme]
Court should decide more cases”).
311 See VERMEULE, supra note 114, at 268 (“The Court’s peak capacity runs to about 200
cases per year . . . .”); Strauss, supra note 283, at 1100 (doubting that the Court could
decide more than 150 cases per year).
312 Letter from William Howard Taft to Senator Reed Smoot 2 (July 3, 1925), Taft
Papers, supra note 254, at Reel 275.
313 Jurisdiction Hearing, supra note 263, at 3 (statement of C.J. Taft).
314 Letter from William Howard Taft to Clyde B. Aitchison (Dec. 4, 1925), Taft Papers,
supra note 254, at Reel 278 (emphasis added).
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has urged his colleagues to decide cases “as narrowly as possible.”315
Indeed, in a recent speech at Georgetown University Law Center, he
declared that “ ‘[i]f it is not necessary to decide more to [dispose of] a
case, then in my view it is necessary not to decide more.’”316
The Chief Justice’s plurality opinion in Baze illustrates this ap-
proach.  The decision was confined to Kentucky’s lethal injection pro-
tocol317 and thus failed to provide lower courts with “‘a clear sense of
. . . the rule of law to be followed and applied’” in any other lethal
injection challenge.318  Likewise, the Court in Sosa declined to estab-
lish a principle to govern future ATS litigation.  Instead, the Court
corrected what it found to be the “error” in the court of appeals’ deci-
sion below, which had allowed the plaintiff’s arbitrary detention
claim.  And, to correct that mistake, it was “enough to hold that a
single illegal detention of less than a day, followed by the transfer of
custody to lawful authorities and a prompt arraignment, violates no
norm of customary international law so well defined as to support the
creation of a federal remedy.”319
Such an emphasis on dispute resolution “reflects a familiar view
of [the] judicial function.”320  Courts (particularly federal courts) are
often said to resolve cases, not broad legal questions.321  But such a
vision of the Supreme Court’s function is at odds with the premises
underlying the 1925 and 1988 Judiciary Acts and is inconsistent with
the Court’s role in our current judicial hierarchy.  Minimalist deci-
sions, much like the Court’s “unsatisfactory” summary dispositions,322
“provide uncertain guidelines for the courts that are bound to follow
them.”323  And, unlike its predecessor in the early nineteenth century,
the current Supreme Court lacks the capacity to provide the needed
guidance on subsequent review.  Accordingly, when the current Court
315 Rosen, supra note 40.  The Chief Justice has explained that his goal is to promote
unanimity on the Supreme Court. Id. (reporting that Chief Justice Roberts seeks “to pro-
mote unanimity and collegiality on the Court, encouraging his colleagues to decide cases
as narrowly as possible so that liberal and conservative justices [can] converge on common
results”).
316 See More Consensus on Court, supra note 26 (quoting Chief Justice Roberts).
317 See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1537–38 (2008).
318 Sherman, supra note 69 (quoting Dean Chemerinsky).
319 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 738 (2004).
320 Strauss, supra note 283, at 1101.
321 Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement allows a federal court to decide legal
questions only in the context of a specific case and thus (arguably) demands that the court
tailor each legal pronouncement to the circumstances before it.  As noted, I have brack-
eted for now the possible tension between the case-or-controversy requirement and a Su-
preme Court presumption in favor of vertical maximalism. See supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
322 Letter from Supreme Court to Sen. DeConcini (June 22, 1978), reprinted in Gress-
man, supra note 243, at 1328.
323 H.R. REP. NO. 100-660, at 28 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 766, 782 (Letter
from Supreme Court to Rep. Kastenmeier (June 17, 1982)).
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issues a minimalist opinion, it leaves much to be decided by the lower
courts and thereby delegates its supreme law–declaration function to
its judicial inferiors.
The above historical survey reveals an interesting twist on the
Court’s role in the judicial hierarchy.  In the late eighteenth century
(and for several decades thereafter), the Court’s principal means of
ensuring its “supreme” role was error correction.  In that era, because
Supreme Court reports were unavailable in some regions, the Court
could not simply issue written decisions and expect its precedents to
be obeyed.  Today, however, the situation is reversed.  Although I do
not seek to identify the precise moment in history at which error cor-
rection ceased to be a viable means of overseeing the lower federal
and state courts, I do claim that it is not an effective oversight mecha-
nism today.
To perform its “supreme” role in the current judicial hierarchy,
the Court should aim to issue broad precedents that “clarify the law”
and provide guidance “in [the many] other cases” that it lacks the ca-
pacity to review.324  Thus, “faced with a controversy over a subject it is
likely to see but once or twice a decade,” the modern Court should
not “simply decide the case in the most direct manner possible,” but
should (to the extent possible) issue broad decisions that “put that
part of the law’s house in order.”325  To serve its constitutional role in
this judicial hierarchy, the Court should aim in every case to issue a
vertically maximal decision.
CONCLUSION
There are undoubtedly many areas of federal law that “cr[y] out
for clarification from the Supreme Court.”326  And, as the supreme
leader of the judiciary, the Court has an obligation to provide such
clarification.  But, given the vast size of the current judicial system, the
Court is considerably limited in its capacity to perform that law-decla-
ration function.  Accordingly, the Court must make the most of the
cases it does hear by issuing broad decisions that govern a number of
future cases in the lower federal and state courts.  The Supreme Court
should, in short, adopt a presumption in favor of vertical maximalism.
Thus, contrary to Chief Justice Roberts’s suggestion, the modern
Court should not serve as an “umpire,” calling balls and strikes in par-
ticular disputes.  The Supreme Court has a constitutional responsibil-
ity to establish the “strike zone” for the entire judiciary.
324 Letter from William Howard Taft to Clyde B. Aitchison (Dec. 4, 1925), (Taft Pa-
pers, supra note 254, at Reel 278 (emphasis added).
325 Strauss, supra note 283, at 1095.
326 Fletcher, supra note 97, at 671.
